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I.   INTRODUCTION
By the year 2050, the human population is expected to increase by 
more than thirty-five percent.1 At present, we are thus simultaneous-
ly facing pressure for an efficient energy increase,2 while also trying 
to adhere to an international regime to slow climate change. 
 The result is an international struggle between each State’s abili-
ty to provide efficient and reliable energy while also doing its part to 
preserve the atmosphere. The major complication to all of this is the 
question of how far each State will go to accomplish such efficient 
energy: will a State stay within the bounds of its duties presented by 
international environmental law and adhere to its duties for envi-
ronmental and atmospheric preservation, or will it push further with 
no adherence to either the law or recognition of the environmental 
harm to its own territory or the territory of others? 
 This Comment will present and analyze international environ-
mental law as it applies to the construction and use of hydroelectric 
dams. Overall, this Comment will show that while there are relevant 
laws, many times a harmed State still has no recourse. To demon-
strate this conclusion, this Comment will first provide general back-
ground regarding hydroelectric dams and follow with an explanation 
of the resulting benefits and harms, focusing primarily on environ-
mental concerns. Second, this Comment will identify and thoroughly 
analyze relevant sources of international environmental law, and it 
will highlight both strengths and weaknesses of these sources. Third, 
this Comment will offer specific examples of transboundary agree-
                                                                                                                    
 1. U.N. Dep’t of Econ. and Soc. Aff., Population Div., World Population Prospects: 
The 2006 Revision Executive Summary, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/261/ES [hereinafter 
World Population Prospects], available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/ 
wpp2006/English.pdf. Specifically, the 2006 Revision estimates that by 2050 the world 
population will reach 9.2 billion from the 6.7 billion estimate at the time. Id.
 2. In addition to needing more energy as a result of increased population, almost two 
billion people do not have access to affordable energy services at all, particularly in devel-
oping countries. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME ET AL., WORLD ENERGY ASSESSMENT: OVERVIEW,
2004 UPDATE, at 34, U.N. Sales No. E.04.111.B.6 (2004) [hereinafter WORLD ENERGY
ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.undp.org/energy/docs/WEAOU_full.pdf; see also 
World Population Prospects, supra note 1. Thus, an increase in energy sources is necessary 
in order to alleviate significant health impacts, and such an increase may even raise the 
level of education, especially for women and children. WORLD ENERGY ASSESSMENT, supra.
In order to cook, women and children are forced to spend long periods of time gathering 
firewood and water. Id. Because of the physical energy required, “women and children of-
ten have no opportunities for education and other productive activities, while their health 
suffers.” Id.
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ments or, in many situations, the lack of agreements. These exam-
ples will illustrate direct application of international laws and por-
tray the extreme deficiencies in enforceability. Lastly, this Comment 
will offer a brief conclusion regarding both a specific hydroelectric 
dam dispute and the state of the relevant law in general.  
II.   BACKGROUND
 Hydroelectric dams exist on international watercourses world-
wide, and some States even use hydropower as their primary source 
of energy.3 There are approximately 45,000 large dams in the world, 
including both hydroelectric and nonhydroelectric dams.4 Between 
1990 and 1997, hydropower generated approximately 18.5% of the 
world’s electricity, and as of 2004, hydropower accounted for 16% of 
the world’s energy production.5
 While hydroelectric dams contribute to atmospheric preservation, 
they still present much concern. Whether these benefits outweigh the 
concerns is controversial, debatable, and a contributing factor to 
many international political disputes. The main problem is address-
ing the issues that arise between States given the applicable interna-
tional environmental law. While one State may determine that the 
advantages of a particular hydroelectric dam outweighs the potential 
disadvantages, another nation, also affected by the potential dam, 
may not agree. The possibility for this scenario is quite likely since 
nearly fifty percent of Earth’s land surface (not including Antarctica) 
and sixty percent of all fresh water are part of transboundary water 
                                                                                                                    
 3. ROY L. NERSESIAN, ENERGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO 
CONVENTIONAL AND ALTERNATIVE SOURCES 290-91 (2007) (noting that sixty-five countries 
rely on hydropower for more than fifty percent of their electricity generation); see also 
Mustafa Balat, Electricity from Worldwide Energy Sources, 1 ENERGY SOURCES PART B:
ECON. PLAN. & POL’Y 395, 401 (2006) (citing G. Bergkamp et al., Dams, Ecosystem Func-
tions, and Environmental Restoration (2000)). Canada is the largest producer of hydroelec-
tric power, followed by Norway and the United States. Id.
 Hydroelectric power, also known as hydropower, refers to the process of using wa-
ter’s energy to create electricity. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Wind and Hydropower Technologies 
Program: How Hydropower Works, http://www1.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/ 
hydro_how.html (last visited June 1, 2009) [hereinafter How Hydropower Works]. While 
several types of hydropower plants exist, this Comment specifically pertains to hydroelec-
tric dam use through an impoundment facility, which is the most common type of hydroe-
lectric power facility. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Wind & Hydropower Technologies Program: 
Types of Hydropower Plants, http://www1.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/ 
hydro_plant_types.html (last visited June 1, 2009). Once a dam is built, a reservoir (an ar-
tificial man-made lake) is created on the upstream side of the dam. See id. When it is time 
to generate electricity, water is released from the reservoir, moving through a turbine 
creating energy. Id. This energy is then put onto the electrical grid and eventually used in 
homes, businesses, and industries. How Hydropower Works, supra.
 4. NERSESIAN, supra note 3, at 290-91. 
 5. Id. at 300. 
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basins, meaning that the majority of Earth’s water is shared water.6
When faced with disputes, a harmed State is ultimately left only to 
rely on sources of international environmental law for guidance.  
III.   BENEFITS OR HARMS: WHICH PREVAILS?
A.   Benefits 
 In comparison to other existing forms of energy production, the 
most notable benefit of hydropower is that hydroelectric dams do not 
directly emit greenhouse gasses.7 Specifically, since water is the 
main component of hydropower generation, burning of coal or use of 
either oil or fuels is not necessary.8 Likewise, the water used—and 
thus the river as a whole—is not polluted.9 Additionally, although 
the construction of hydroelectric dams and their turbines is quite 
costly,10 the cost of energy generation is rather inexpensive.11
 In comparison to other sources of energy production, hydroelectric 
dams also provide power that is both predictable and reliable.12
These dams allow the storage of water (in the reservoir) until it is 
needed and then allow a rapid increase in energy production (more 
                                                                                                                    
 6. Water Encyclopedia, Transboundary Water Treaties, 
http://www.waterencyclopedia.com/St-Ts/Transboundary-Water-Treaties.html (last visited 
June 1, 2009) (“A transboundary waterway is defined as all territory which contributes to a 
stream, at least one of the tributaries of which crosses a boundary.”); see also LUDWIK A.
TECLAFF, THE RIVER BASIN IN HISTORY AND LAW 42-46 (1967) (emphasizing, through mul-
tiple examples, the vast amount of trade that was facilitated because of the existence of a 
large number of transboundary rivers and noting that “[t]he influence of the physical unity 
of the basin proved stronger than political divisions”). 
 7. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Wind and Hydropower Technologies Program: Advan-
tages and Disadvantages of Hydropower, http://www1.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/ 
hydro_ad.html (last visited June 1, 2009); see also Thomas Moran, The Environmental and 
Socio-Economic Impacts of Hydroelectric Dams in Turkish Kurdistan 24-25 (June 10, 2004) 
(unpublished thesis, Roskilde University), available at http://rudar.ruc.dk/handle/1800/403.
 8. See WILLIAM WHIPPLE, JR., WATER RESOURCES: A NEW ERA FOR COORDINATION
64-65 (1998); see also U.S. Dep’t of Energy, supra note 7. 
 9. See NERSESIAN, supra note 3, at 291.
 10. Id.; see, e.g., NASA Satellites Watch as China Constructs Giant Dam,
SCIENCEDAILY, June 13, 2007, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/06/ 
070612134358.htm (stating that the total construction cost of the Three Gorges Dam on 
the Yangtze River in China, which is now the largest hydroelectric dam in the world, was 
at least $625 billion).  
 11. NERSESIAN, supra note 3, at 291 (noting that “hydropower has no fuel cost and a 
low operating cost”); see also 25x’25, Why Renewables: Hydroelectric and Tidal Power, 
http://www.25x25.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=19&Itemid=48 (last 
visited June 1, 2009). “25x’25” is an alliance originally created by a group of farm leaders 
who had a goal of obtaining twenty-five percent of America’s energy from renewable 
sources—such as wind, solar, and biofuels—by 2025. About 25x’25, http://www.25x25.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=41 (last visited June 1, 2009).
 Additionally, hydroelectric power can be highly automated. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 
supra note 7 (noting that engineers can control the amount of water flowing through the 
turbines to “produce electricity on demand”). 
 12. 25x’25, supra note 11. 
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quickly than power plants using fossil fuel for energy production) 
during periods of higher demand.13
 Similar to other types of dams, hydroelectric dams also serve as a 
flood control mechanism.14 Compared to a river functioning in its 
natural state, a dam can maintain more water in the reservoir and 
thus allow less water to move downstream.15 Many times, this can 
protect downstream communities from flooding.16
 Additional indirect benefits of hydroelectric dam construction are 
that it “[e]nhances knowledge and improves management of valued 
species due to study results” and that it can sometimes create new 
freshwater ecosystems which are more productive.17 Immediately af-
ter floods, fish populations typically increase because the floods “en-
able fish to move out into floodplain[18] wetlands to feed and repro-
duce.”19 Similarly, floods recharge groundwater supplies and wet-
lands and natural fertilize farmland.20
B.   Harms 
 Despite the undoubted benefits, many still feel that hydroelectric 
dams present serious environmental concerns, which should be con-
sidered in conjunction.21
1.   Methane Gas and Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
 Hydroelectric dams are considered a “clean” source of renewable 
energy22 because they do not directly emit greenhouse gases. Howev-
er, evidence that dams’ reservoirs emit methane gas may arguably 
                                                                                                                    
 13. Id.
 14. Id.
 15. See id.
 16. Id. But see infra text accompanying notes 84-86 (questioning dams’ efficacy in pro-
tecting downstream communities). 
 17. Moran, supra note 7, at 25. 
 18. A river’s floodplain is an important part of the river system. Institute for Ecologi-
cal Health, Floodplain Management, http://www.instituteforecologicalhealth.org/ 
floodplain_management.html (last visited June 1, 2009). In a river’s natural state, “a dy-
namic river will move its course to and fro over a long time frame . . . . Riparian vegetation 
and wetlands associated with streams and rivers are essential habitats for a great number 
of animal and plant species.” Id.
 19. Misty Herrin, The Nature Conservancy, China: Minimizing Dam Impact on the 
Yangtze River, http://www.nature.org/wherewework/asiapacific/china/features/ 
yangtzedams.html (last visited June 1, 2009) (interview with Qiaoyu Gou, Project Manag-
er, The Nature Conservancy’s China Program).  
 20. Id.
 21. See NERSESIAN, supra note 3, at 291.
 22. Environmental Literacy Council, Hydroelectric Power, 
http://www.enviroliteracy.org/article.php/59.html (last visited June 1, 2009) [hereinafter 
ELC, Hydroelectric Power]. The Environmental Literacy Council is an independent, non-
profit organization providing general environmental science information for educators and 
the public. Environmental Literacy Council, About Us, http://www.enviroliteracy.org/ 
subcategory.php?id=1 (last visited June 1, 2009).
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refute the claim that these dams are environmentally friendly.23 Es-
sentially, “man-made reservoirs convert carbon dioxide in the atmos-
phere into methane.”24 According to critics, in tropical areas of Brazil 
where large dams produce more than ninety percent of electricity, 
the dams’ reservoirs emit such a high amount of methane gas that 
the dams’ contribution to climate change is even greater than that of 
equivalent fossil fuel power plants.25 For example, estimates show 
that the Balbina Dam in Brazil produces between twenty and forty 
times more carbon dioxide than power plants using coal.26 According 
to the estimates of Philip Fearnside of Brazil’s National Institute for 
Research in the Amazon in Manaus, such high emission rates are 
from carbon that is “tied up in trees and other plants [which is] re-
leased when the reservoir is initially flooded and the plants rot.”27 Af-
ter the initial decay, plant parts then settle on the floor of the reser-
voir and continue to decompose, which results in an increase of dis-
solved methane because the plants are decomposing with no oxy-
gen.28 When water passes through the turbine, this dissolved me-
thane is released into the air.29 Fernando Ramos, lead scientist for 
the National Space Research Institute (INPE) in Brazil, stated that 
“ ‘[i]t’s like opening a bottle of soda. A large part of the methane is 
dissolved in the water bubbles, and it’s released to the atmosphere.’ ”30
 While great uncertainty exists as to how much methane hydroe-
lectric dams actually emit into the atmosphere,31 INPE scientists es-
timate that large dams may be responsible for worldwide annual 
emissions of 800 million tons of carbon dioxide, whereas the United 
Kingdom’s total greenhouse gas emissions in 2006 was around 660 
million tons.32
                                                                                                                    
 23. See Duncan Graham-Rowe, Hydroelectric Power’s Dirty Secret Revealed,
NEWSCIENTIST, Feb. 24, 2005, http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7046; Tim 
Hirsch, Project Aims to Extract Dam Methane, BBC NEWS, May 10, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/6638705.stm. 
 24. Graham-Rowe, supra note 23. 
 25. Id.
 26. International Rivers, Frequently Asked Questions About Dams, 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/node/480 (last visited June 1, 2009) [hereinafter 
Frequently Asked Questions About Dams]. 
 27. Graham-Rowe, supra note 23. 
 28. Id.
 29. Id.
 30. Hirsch, supra note 23. 
 31. See id. Each dam may emit different levels of methane gas. Id. The amount of me-
thane gas emitted depends on, among other things, the amount of vegetation in the water, 
the water’s temperature, and the reservoir’s shape. Id.
 32. Id. Although not within the scope of this Comment, it is relevant to note that the 
INPE scientists have proposed that “with relatively simple technology, this unwanted by-
product of hydro-electric power generation could be turned into an extra source of clean, 
renewable electricity.” See id. (providing a brief note on and a detailed chart regarding 
such technology). 
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2.   River Flow and Affected Ecosystems 
Freshwater ecosystems provide many things that humans de-
pend on, such as “food and fiber, water purification,” and “fish 
and wildlife.”33 But in order to provide these things, freshwater 
ecosystems are dependent upon the “cycling of water and on 
functioning ecological processes and species assemblages.”34 In 
order to maintain the health of these ecosystems, the water must 
maintain a particular level of both quality and quantity.35 Thou-
sands of species and activities depend upon freshwater ecosys-
tems.36 Specifically, approximately forty percent of fish are of a 
freshwater species and approximately 200 new freshwater spe-
cies are identified yearly.37 And, of the 10,000 freshwater species 
that have already been identified, approximately 2,000 are al-
ready endangered, vulnerable, or extinct.38 Given the large num-
ber of species relying on these ecosystems and the number of 
these species that are endangered and vulnerable, maintaining 
the ecosystems is of grave importance.39
 The most significant environmental impact of hydroelectric dams 
is, arguably, the alteration of the affected river’s flow.40 When river 
flows are altered, it is not merely the visible appearance of the river 
that is changed. Rather, it is a cycle that has much deeper impacts—
even beyond the river itself.41
(a)   Natural Flooding 
 While flood control is undoubtedly beneficial to some extent, espe-
cially for those who would otherwise lose their communities and 
businesses, arguably “[t]he elimination of the benefits provided by 
                                                                                                                    
 33. Karin M. Krchnak, The Nature Conservancy, “Greening” Hydropower: Integrating 






 38.  Id.
 39. See id.
 40. International Rivers, Environmental Impacts of Dams, 
http://internationalrivers.org/en/node/1545 (last visited June 1, 2009) [hereinafter Envi-
ronmental Impacts of Dams]. Note that this impact is caused by other types of large dams 
as well. Id. Also note that hydroelectric dams impact groundwater and wetlands. See Kr-
chnak, supra note 33, at 2. Other than general references, however, these issues are out-
side the scope of this Comment. 
 41. See infra Part III.B.2 (focusing on the harms to a river’s flow and surrounding 
ecosystem caused by hydroelectric dam construction and use). 
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natural flooding may be the single most ecologically damaging im-
pact of a dam.”42
 Biologists generally recognize dams as the most damaging of the 
sources that contribute to the disappearance of riverine species.43 The 
loss of natural flooding affects river and floodplain ecosystems over-
all. Such ecosystems “are closely adapted to a river’s flooding cycle. 
The native plants and animals depend on its variations for reproduc-
tion, hatching, migration, and other important lifecycle stages. An-
nual floods deposit nutrients on the land, flush out backwater chan-
nels, and replenish wetlands.”44
 (b)   Ecosystem Fragmentation 
 Damming a river fragments the riverine ecosystem by isolating 
the upstream and downstream ecosystems and cutting off species’ 
migration habits;45 this causes serious changes to species’ historical 
spawning habits.46 For example, in the current construction of the 
Brazilian Madeira River hydroelectric dams,47 catfish have become 
“the main symbol of the controversy.”48 These fish have an intricate 
2,000-mile migration to the “mouth of the Amazon,” and, according to 
experts, the dams will disrupt this migration.49 River ecosystem 
fragmentation has resulted in a serious reduction in watershed spe-
cies.50 For example, in the Northwest United States, as a result of 
hydroelectric dam construction (among other reasons, such as over-
                                                                                                                    
 42. PATRICK MCCULLY, SILENCED RIVERS: THE ECOLOGY AND POLITICS OF LARGE
DAMS 31 (2001). 
 43. Lori Pottinger, International Rivers, Environmental Impacts of Large Dams: Afri-
can Examples (Oct. 1, 1996), http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/africa/environmental-
impacts-large-dams-african-examples. 
 44. Id.
 45. MCCULLY, supra note 42, at 31; see also WHIPPLE, supra note 8, at 65. It should be 
noted that certain technologies have been used on hydroelectric dams in order to alleviate 
some fish migration problems. See WHIPPLE, supra note 8, at 66-67 (“[T]he dams on the Co-
lumbia [River] and many other rivers have fish ladders, which are quite efficient in allow-
ing movement of adult fish migrating upstream in order to spawn. However, the problems 
of moving the immature ‘fingerlings’ downstream after spawning have proved much more 
difficult to handle.”). 
 46. See generally D.D. Dauble et al., Impacts of the Columbia River Hydroelectric Sys-
tem on Main-Stem Habitats of Fall Chinook Salmon, 23 N. AM. J. FISHERIES MGMT. 641 
(2003) (describing the changes in the spawning habits and the resulting decrease in  
anadromous fish run populations in the Columbia and Snake rivers as a result of hydroe-
lectric dams). 
 47. See infra Part VI.C.
 48. Larry Rohter, Both Sides Say Project Is Pivotal Issue for Brazil, N.Y. TIMES 
ONLINE, June 11, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/11/world/americas/11amazon.html. 
 49. Id.
 50. MCCULLY, supra note 42, at 31. It is noteworthy, however, that species isolation 
may be beneficial for some species, because dams provide a reservoir that allows for the 
creation of habitat for lake fish. Id. Additionally, the increase in the amount of cool wa-
ter—released as a result of creation of the reservoir—may allow some fish to thrive that 
could not have done so when the water was warm. Id.
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fishing) on the Columbia River, anadromous fish populations have 
decreased from an average of 10 to 16 million fish per year at the be-
ginning of the twentieth century to an annual run size of only  
2.5 million.51
 Currently, the exact global extent of river ecosystem fragmenta-
tion caused by dams has not been determined.52 However, Swedish 
ecologists, Mats Dynesius and Christer Nilsson, from the University 
of Umeå,
estimated the degree of damage to river systems in the US, Cana-
da, Europe and the former USSR. . . . [and] found that fully 77 per 
cent of the total water discharge of the 139 largest river systems in 
these countries is ‘strongly or moderately affected by fragmenta-
tion of the river channels by dams and by water regulation result-
ing from reservoir operation, interbasin diversion  
and irrigation’.53
Dynesius and Nilsson also concluded that “ ‘[a]s a result of habitat 
destruction and obstruction to organism dispersal,’ . . . ‘many rive-
rine species may have become extinct over vast areas, whereas popu-
lations of others have become fragmented and run the risk of  
future extinction.’ ”54
 (c)   Sediment Displacement 
 Sedimentary deposits, to both river channels and banks, are per-
tinent: “too much sediment can aggrade channels and cause flooding 
problems, whereas erosion of sediment can degrade habitat.”55 While 
natural sediment levels vary between regions of the world (and thus 
sedimentation affects areas differently) according to the World 
Commission on Dams, assuming that no controls are implemented to 
control sedimentation, in the next twenty-five to fifty years, reservoir 
                                                                                                                    
 51. Dauble et al., supra note 46, at 641 (“Although the exact amount of fish lost to hy-
dropower development is uncertain, salmonid habitats in the main-stem Columbia and 
Snake rivers have changed dramatically during the past 60 years. For example, many 
areas where salmonids spawned are now a series of low-velocity impoundments, and access 
to other habitats is blocked by impassable barriers.”). For a more recent example of a major 
reduction in freshwater species resulting from dam construction, see infra notes 334-37 
and accompanying text, which discuss a recent “mass killing” of fish during the initial con-
struction phases of the Santo Antonio dam in Brazil. 
 52. MCCULLY, supra note 42, at 31; accord, e.g., Dauble et al., supra note 46, at 641. 
 53. MCCULLY, supra note 42, at 31. 
 54. Id. 
 55. MICHAEL COLLIER ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, CIRCULAR NO.1126, DAMS
AND RIVERS: A PRIMER ON THE DOWNSTREAM EFFECTS OF DAMS, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
3 (2d rev. ed. 2000). 
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sedimentation will eliminate twenty-five percent of the world’s sto-
rage capacity for fresh water.56
 In a river’s normal state, sediments allow natural replenishment 
of the downstream ecosystems by moving sediments downstream and 
depositing them along the riverbeds and river banks; this essentially 
serves as a natural fertilizer.57 A dam, however, captures these natu-
ral sediments and prevents them from moving downstream, thus de-
priving the downstream portion of the river.58 When a river is de-
prived of normal sediment placement, the river seeks to nourish it-
self by eroding the river’s bank and downstream riverbed.59 This can 
even undermine bridges and structures built along the riverbank.60
Within a decade of a dam’s initial operation, downstream riverbeds 
may be eroded by several meters, and damage may even be felt hun-
dreds of kilometers downstream of the dam.61
 Sediment reduction also affects the fish and wildlife relying on the 
natural sediment process.62 For example, because sediment reduction 
causes the water to become clearer, many fish and wildlife species 
will be at greater risk of danger because they are less camouflaged.63
 A river’s loss of natural sediments also affects the upstream por-
tion of the river.64 Just as the downstream portion of the river is de-
prived of these valuable sediments, a dam’s reservoir can be dam-
aged by an accumulation and buildup of these same sediments.65 Be-
cause sediments and nutrients are trapped behind the dam, the lack 
of water flow is then likely to cause growth and spread of algae and 
other aquatic weeds.66 Further, due to lack of movement, water in the 
reservoir becomes stagnant, resulting in loss of oxygen.67 Ultimately, 
this cycle can reduce the number of organisms living in the reser-
voir.68 In extreme cases, sediment buildup can put additional pres-
sure on the dam itself, which can actually weaken the dam.69
                                                                                                                    
 56. Moran, supra note 7, at 22-23 (noting that “the WCD predicts that most of the 
global loss of fresh water storage capacity will occur in the developing countries as well as 
those with higher sedimentation rates”). 
 57. Environmental Impacts of Dams, supra note 40.
 58. Id; see, e.g., infra note 322 and accompanying text (describing study of the ex-
pected effects of Brazil’s Madeira River dam projects with regard to sedimentation). 
 59. Environmental Impacts of Dams, supra note 40. 
 60. Id.
 61. Id.
 62. See Moran, supra note 7, at 23. 
 63. Id. at 24. 
 64. See id. at 23-24. 
 65. Id. at 22. 
 66. ELC, Hydroelectric Power, supra note 22.  
 67. Moran, supra note 7, at 23. 
 68. Id.
 69. Id. at 22. 
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 Groundwater pollution may also result from sediment depriva-
tion.70 Specifically, farmers downstream who rely on the water as  
a source of fertilizer are then forced to use substitute types of  
fertilizer, which may ultimately pollute both the river and the re-
lated groundwater.71
3.   Cultural, Historical, and Health Concerns 
 The human effect is one of the most significant harms of hydroe-
lectric dams.72 The initial construction itself results in mass numbers 
of individuals losing their homes, villages, communities, and ways of 
life.73 Consider the Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River in Chi-
na, for example.74 It was anticipated that the rising waters of the ex-
pansive reservoir could submerge over 140 towns, 326 townships, 
and 1,351 villages, causing over one million people to be moved from 
the general area.75
 The World Commission on Dams estimated that between forty 
and eighty million people have been physically displaced,76 but this 
may be a conservative estimate. The World Bank estimates that ap-
proximately four million people are displaced annually from “approx-
imately 300 large dams (above 15m high) that on average enter con-
struction phase annually.”77 This number, however, does not account 
for those whose livelihoods are affected by dams.78 For example, a 
city’s unemployment may ultimately rise as a result of dam construc-
                                                                                                                    
 70. Id.
 71. Id.
 72. While the social and economic impacts of hydroelectric dams are important and 
relevant to a State’s construction decision, they are outside the scope of this Comment.  
 73. See Matthew Coon Come, Survival in the Context of Mega-Resource Development: 
Experiences of the James Bay Crees and the First Nations of Canada, in IN THE WAY OF 
DEVELOPMENT: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, LIFE PROJECTS AND GLOBALIZATION 153, 155 (Mario 
Baser et al. eds., 2004). Matthew Come described the effects of development on indigenous 
communities in Northern Canada in the early 1970s:  
In 1972 I was a young student . . . , and I read in the newspaper one day about 
Quebec’s ‘hydroelectric project of the century’. [sic] I looked at a map and saw 
that my community’s lands at Mistissini were to be submerged because they 
were going to use Lake Mistissini as a reservoir. It was then that our people 
realized that the plans of Hydro-Quebec to dam and divert more than a dozen 
rivers in our territory would spell an end to our way of life. 
Id.; see also ELC, Hydroelectric Power, supra note 22.
 74. See infra Part III.C.
 75. DAI QING, THE RIVER DRAGON HAS COME!: THE THREE GORGES DAM AND THE FATE
OF CHINA’S YANGTZE RIVER AND ITS PEOPLE 41, 52 (John G. Thibodeau & Philip B. Wil-
liams eds., Yi Ming Trans., 1998). 
 76. THAYER SCUDDER, THE FUTURE OF LARGE DAMS: DEALING WITH SOCIAL,
ENVIRONMENTAL, INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL COSTS 22 (2005); WORLD COMM’N ON 
DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING 104 (2000), 
available at http://www.dams.org//docs/report/wcdreport.pdf. 
 77. SCUDDER, supra note 76, at 22. 
 78. Id.
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tion because farmers are displaced as a result of their land being 
flooded for the creation of the reservoir.79
 Even if river dwellers are not physically displaced by dam con-
struction, they are still impacted. Where dam construction blocks 
migration and ultimately causes complete or partial diminishment of 
a species, river dwellers relying on those species also suffer.80 For ex-
ample, in the case of the Madeira River construction in Brazil,81 fish 
species likely to be negatively affected (which some claim could be-
come extinct) serve as the main protein source of those living along 
the Madeira and Amazon.82 Additionally, since these fish provide 
economically for people living along the rivers,83 elimination of the 
species in the area would, presumably, further contribute to the large 
number of indigent people in the area. 
 Another problem is overreliance on dams as flood protection.84 Of-
ten times, this reliance may prove to be a “false sense of security” 
during large floods, when dams are not sufficient to hold back all of 
the water.85 Specifically, reliance has led people to increase develop-
ment in floodplains, and thus during large floods the resulting dam-
age may be even greater than it otherwise would have been without 
the dam.86
C.   Three Gorges Dam: Yangtze River, China 
 The Three Gorges Dam project on the Yangtze River in China de-
monstrates the difficulty of striking a balance between the benefits 
and harms of hydroelectric dams. The dam was structurally com-
pleted in May 2006 and is the world’s largest reinforced concrete hy-
droelectric dam.87 In late 2008, the final generating unit was in-
stalled, and on March 3, 2009, the project announced that, like the 
other twenty-five generating units, the final generating unit had suc-
                                                                                                                    
 79. Moran, supra note 7, at 7. 
 80. See, e.g., Glenn Switkes, The Americas Program, Brazilian Government Moves to 
Dam Principal Amazon Tributary 2 (2007), http://americas.irc-online.org/pdf/reports/ 
0706amazon-eng.pdf. 
 81. Id.; see also infra Part VI.C. 
 82. Switkes, supra note 80, at 2. For a recent “mass killing” of these fish along the 
Madeira River, see infra notes 334-37 and accompanying text.
 83. Id.
 84. See Institute for Ecological Health, supra note 18. 
 85. Id.
 86. See Bob Schildgen, Unnatural Disasters, SIERRA MAG, May-June 1999, available 
at http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/199905/floods.asp. 
 87. Three Gorges Dam Wall Completed, BBC NEWS, May 20, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5000092.stm. Proposals for dam construction on the 
Yangtze River date back to around 1918, but such a project was not actually accepted until 
1992 and not actually begun until 1994. See China Three Gorges Project, History, 
http://www.ctgpc.com/history/history_a.php (last visited June 1, 2009). 
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cessfully operated for its first 100 days.88 The completed reservoir 
spans 401 square miles.89
 Construction of the Three Gorges Dam has always been, and re-
mains, controversial—especially between scientists who claim that 
the dam will cause extreme environmental harm and the political 
proponents within the Chinese government.90 The Chinese govern-
ment supported the dam for two main reasons—energy generation 
and flood control.91 Regarding energy generation, in comparison to 
coal-fired power stations with electricity generation, the plant will 
decrease carbon dioxide emissions by 100 million tons and will help 
prevent acid rain and the greenhouse effect.92 And, with regard to 
flood control, the Yangtze River is known to have devastating floods; 
for example, a flood in 1998 affected 300 million people.93 Previous 
estimates predicted that upon completion, the flood control standard 
would be upgraded from preventing floods categorized as less than 
10-year floods to preventing 100-year floods.94 Estimates show that 
this upgrade will relieve approximately 15 million people and 1.5 
million hectares of farmland from flooding.95
 In addition to these main goals, the Chinese government intended 
the dam to increase navigability, which would extend the travel 
route into China’s mainland.96 The ultimate hope for this navigability 
                                                                                                                    
 88. China Three Gorges Project, All 26 Generating Units in Smooth Operation for 
First 100 Days, http://www.ctgpc.com/news/news1.php?NewsId=32399 (last visited June  
1, 2009).
 89. NASA Satellites Watch as China Constructs Giant Dam, supra note 10. 
 90. See generally Jim Yardley, Chinese Dam Projects Criticized for Their Human 
Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/ 
19/world/asia/19dam.html. 
 91. Samuel Robert Fishleigh Allin, An Examination of China’s Three Gorges Dam 
Project Based on the Framework Presented in the Report of the World Commission on 
Dams 16-17 (Nov. 30, 2004) (unpublished Master’s thesis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute 
and State University), available at http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/ 
etd-12142004-125131/unrestricted/SAllin_010304.pdf. Chinese Government documents,  
especially those released by the Ministry of Water Resources, commonly note 
that overall ecosystem enhancement will occur because of the [Three Gorges 
Dam]. This will include the establishment of new ecosystems supported by the 
[Three Gorges Dam] reservoir and better, more controlled conditions in the 
areas downstream of the dam. Based on the literature and findings of the 
WCD, this statement should be questioned. There are a few recognized ecosys-
tem benefits that occur from the construction of large dams, however the net 
environmental effect is almost always negative. 
Id. at 22-23. 
 92. China Three Gorges Project, Environment, http://www.ctgpc.com/environmental/ 
environmental_a.php (last visited June 1, 2009). 
 93. Allin, supra note 91, at 16 (citations omitted). 
 94. China Three Gorges Project, Biggest Flood Control Benefit in the World, 
http://www.ctgpc.com/benefifs/benefifs_a.php (last visited June 1, 2009). 
 95. Id.
 96. Allin, supra note 91, at 17. 
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increase was to “cause the emergence of new markets, job creation, 
and economic vitality.”97 Earlier estimates provided that when com-
plete, as it now is, the annual one-way navigation capacity of the 
Yangtze River at the dam would increase from ten million to fifty 
million tons.98 Yet another goal of the Chinese Government was ac-
cessibility to fresh water.99 The dam was projected to increase fresh 
water access for both agriculture and consumption purposes.100
 While many economic benefits are (or at least are expected to be) 
derived from construction and operation of the Three Gorges Dam, 
the environmental concerns may arguably undermine these bene-
fits.101 Currently, obvious problems caused by the dam include drastic 
changes to the river’s water temperature, silt levels, and seasonal 
fluctuations in the river’s flow.102 Additionally, significant amounts of 
reservoir greenhouse gas emissions will result from vegetation 
breakdown, silt, and other organics, which decompose at the bottom 
of the reservoir.103 Thus, the alleged “clean energy” theory for the 
Three Gorges Dam is undermined because of these reservoir green-
house gas emissions.104 Furthermore, silting may eventually cause an 
increase in flooding because of silt buildup in the dam’s reservoir.105
Even more extreme is that this silt buildup may “reduce the effec-
tiveness of power generation schemes, while upstream siltation may 
impact navigability.”106
 The downstream portion of the river is also affected by this silt 
buildup in the reservoir. This buildup results in less silt flowing 
downstream, thus compromising the river’s ability to naturally rep-
lenish itself.107 Loss of nutrients then reduces “fertility” of the  
agricultural lands downstream,108 and the “[d]isruption of the  
natural distribution and timing of streamflow disrupt[s]  
aquatic ecosystems.”109
 After supporting the Three Gorges Dam project for over a decade, 
on September 26, 2007, China’s Communist Party gave a firm warn-
ing that unless preventative measures were quickly taken, an envi-
ronmental disaster was approaching for the areas surrounding the 
                                                                                                                    
 97. Id.
 98. China Three Gorges Project, Remarkable Navigation Benefit, 
http://www.ctgpc.com/benefifs/benefifs_a_3.php (last visited June 1, 2009). 
 99. Allin, supra note 91, at 17. 
 100. Id.
 101. NERSESIAN, supra note 3, at 301. 
 102. Allin, supra note 91, at 20. 
 103. Id. at 19.
 104. Id.
 105. Id. at 20. 
 106. Id.
107. Id. at 20-21. 
 108. Id. at 20. 
 109. Id.
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dam and that the same areas were paying a serious and possibly  
catastrophic environmental cost.110 Further, Wang Xiaofeng, the di-
rector of the administrative office that built the dam, noted that “it 
was time to face up to the environmental consequences of a project 
hailed as an achievement to rival the Great Wall.”111 Specifically, 
Xiaofeng stated: “ ‘We absolutely cannot relax our guard against eco-
logical and environmental security problems sparked by the Three 
Gorges project. We cannot win passing economic prosperity at the 
cost of the environment.’ ”112
 Overall, while there are nonenvironmental benefits resulting from 
the Three Gorges Dam and hydroelectric dams in general, there are 
many negative environmental impacts, which a State should tho-
roughly analyze when deciding whether to construct such a dam. The 
previous discussion of the Three Gorges Dam demonstrates the se-
riousness of dams’ potential environmental harm and shows one 
State’s realization that further analysis of the benefits and harms 
was necessary: “It was hailed as one of the engineering feats of the 
20th century. Now the Three Gorges Dam across China’s mighty 
Yangtze River threatens to become an environmental catastrophe.”113
IV.   INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
 Beyond the actual environmental impacts on a State, an addition-
al concern is that dam construction may also cause harm to the other
States that have rights to the same transboundary watercourse. 
Thus, the focus of this Comment now turns to the relevant sources of 
international environmental law in an attempt to address States’ le-
gal duties in the construction and use of hydroelectric dams.  
 International environmental law, while not as well established or 
readily enforceable as many States’ domestic law, essentially oper-
ates through customary international law and treaties.114 Customary 
                                                                                                                    
 110. Jane Macartney, Three Gorges Dam Is a Disaster in the Making, China Admits,
TIMES ONLINE, Sept. 27, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/ 
world/article2537279.ece. 
 111. Id.
 112. Id. For a further look at the events surrounding these comments by the Chinese 
government, see generally Yardley, supra note 90, and Jim Yardley, China Says Three 
Gorges Dam Is Not Responsible for Landslides, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/world/asia/28gorges.html. 
 113. Macartney, supra note 110.
 114. Customary International Law consists of principles that have become standard ei-
ther in a particular region or internationally; such practices are “undertaken out of a sense 
of legal obligation (the opinio juris).” Joseph W. Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments for 
Managing Internationally-Shared Water Resources: Restricted Sovereignty vs. Community 
of Property, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 27, 33 (1994) (citation omitted). “Practices that 
crystallize as customary international law can include multilateral decisions reflected in 
votes in international assemblies, decisions by international courts or international arbi-
trators, or apparently unilateral actions of states. Even treaties or other international 
agreements can express customary rules of international law.” Id. at 34 (citations omitted). 
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international law is binding on all States, and a particular treaty is 
binding on those States that have signed on.115
 For clarity purposes, this Section is organized by first detailing 
those broad themes of international environmental law that, among 
many other issues, are relevant to transboundary watercourses. 
Next, this Section will present several sources of international envi-
ronmental law specifically applicable to transboundary watercourses 
and thus applicable to hydroelectric dam construction and use on 
such waters. Finally, this Section will focus on recurring themes pre-
sented in these sources, highlight strengths and weaknesses, and 
discuss the enforceability of these sources.  
A.   Broad Sources of International Environmental Law 
1.   Relevant Sources 
 Both the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment (“Stockholm Declaration”),116 adopted in 1972, 
and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (“Rio Dec-
laration”),117 adopted in 1992, present general principles of interna-
tional law that are applicable to, among other issues, transboundary 
watercourses and hydroelectric dams.118 While neither the Stockholm 
Declaration119 nor the Rio Declaration were originally binding,120
                                                                                                                    
Customary international law, however, is not sufficient to deal with all global environmen-
tal problems; “even on the most optimistic view, customary international law can hardly be 
said to have sufficient scope or content to prevent damage and provide sufficient sanctions 
to be directed against the perpetrators of the damage when it occurs.” INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 14 (Anthony D’Amato & Kirsten Engel eds., 1996).  
 115. See generally INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 114, 
at 109.  
 116. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 
5-16, 1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (June 16, 1972), revised by U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Corr.1 (1972), re-
printed in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]. The Stockholm Dec-
laration was adopted after the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
met in Stockholm from June 5 through June 16, 1972. Id. The Conference adopted this dec-
laration after it “considered the need for a co[m]mon outlook and for common principles to 
inspire and guide the peoples of the world in the preservation and enhancement of the hu-
man environment.” Id.
 117. Twenty years after the Stockholm Declaration was created, the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development was adopted following the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil from June 3 through June 14, 
1992. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., 
June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1 (June 13,1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) [hereinafter Rio 
Declaration]. Endorsed by 172 nations, the declaration reaffirms the Stockholm Declara-
tion and builds on it, “[w]ith the goal of establishing a new and equitable global partner-
ship through the creation of new levels of cooperation among States.” Id.
 118. See id.; see also Stockholm Declaration, supra note 116. 
 119. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 116 (describing itself as “common prin-
ciples to inspire and guide the peoples of the world in the preservation and enhancement of 
the human environment,” as opposed to requiring such actions); see also INTERNATIONAL
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even on those States that signed on to the Declarations, each offers 
much to the field of international environmental law.121 The Stock-
holm Declaration, in particular, has proven especially influential in 
the field of international environmental law,122 as it was the first 
“widely accepted effort to set forth basic concepts and principles,” and 
certain Stockholm principles are indeed considered customary inter-
national law.123 At present, the Rio Declaration has not received such 
widespread acceptance; however, certain Rio principles are accepted 
as customary international law and are therefore binding.124
2.   Relevant Themes 
 (a)   Development and Resource Exploitation 
 The well-established Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration,125
which is widely considered customary international law,126 provides 
that States have “the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental policies.”127 Important, howev-
                                                                                                                    
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 114, at 17 (“The view prevailed that the 
[Stockholm] Declaration should merely outline ‘broad goals and objectives . . . .’ ”). 
 120. JOHN O’BRIEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 555-56 (2001); see also Rio Declaration, supra
note 117 (providing that its “goal” was to “establish[] a new and equitable global partner-
ship through the creation of new levels of cooperation among States,” but not mentioning 
any requirement of such cooperation).  
 121. See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 464-
66 (3d ed. 2007). 
 122. See Said Mahmoudi, Introduction to CTR. FOR OCEANS LAW & POLICY, THE 
STOCKHOLM DECLARATION AND LAW OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 3, 3-4 (Myron H. Nord-
quist et al., eds. 2003) (“The Stockholm Conference and the declaration that the participat-
ing States adopted at the end of the conference are generally considered as the starting 
point for what constitutes today the modern international law and policy for the environ-
ment.”); id. at 3 (“The significance of the Stockholm Declaration lies in the fact that despite 
all the obstacles and lack of genuine political will on the part of a great number of States, 
it succeeded in laying down a number of general principles that since then have consti-
tuted a framework and a source of reference whenever a step has been taken for the inter-
national protection of the environment.”); id. at 4 (“Repeated references to the Stockholm 
Declaration in almost all major international environmental agreements show that the 
Declaration is indeed a milestone and the starting point for the body of laws and policies 
that today apply to the protection of the environment at the international level.”). 
 123. Alexandre Kiss, The Destiny of the Principles of the Stockholm Declaration, in THE 
STOCKHOLM DECLARATION AND LAW OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 122, at 53,
59 (noting that Stockholm Principles 1 and 21 “have been developed into customary rules”).
 124. Id.; see, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 137-39. 
 125. The Rio Declaration adopted this same concept in Rio Principle 2. See Rio Decla-
ration, supra note 117, princ. 2. The only change made, in comparison to Stockholm Prin-
ciple 21, was the addition of the words “and developmental” to then read, in relevant part, 
“the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental 
and developmental policies.” Id. (emphasis added). This was added presumably because of 
the overall theme of development focused on by the Conference.  
 126. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 121, at 465. 
 127. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 116, princ. 21; see also INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 114, at 19. 
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er, is that this right to exploit comes with a major exception.128 Prin-
ciple 21 requires that States “ensure that activities within their ju-
risdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”129 Prin-
ciple 14 of the Stockholm Declaration provides guidance by stating 
that to “reconcil[e] any conflict between the needs of development 
and the need to protect and improve the environment,”130 States must 
use the “essential tool” of “[r]ational planning.”131 According to 
Stockholm Principle 13, to “ensure that development is compatible 
with the need to protect and improve the human environment for the 
benefit of [a State’s] population,” “States should adopt an integrated 
and coordinated approach to [its] development planning.”132
 The Corfu Channel133 case also demonstrates the general notion 
that States are not entitled to use their territories in ways that will 
ultimately harm other States.134 Specifically, the case provides that 
States may not use their territory in ways that they know will dam-
age other States.135 If States do act with such knowledge, they must 
compensate the harmed State for the damage caused.136
 (b)   Environmental Preservation 
 The Precautionary Principle or Approach also receives widespread 
usage in international law, and it may be considered international 
environmental law.137 Since at least the 1960s, the Precautionary 
Principle has been used in international issues, but at least since the 
1980s, it has been frequently used in international environmental
law—through both multilateral and bilateral treaties.138 While the 
usage of the Precautionary Approach as an international rule has not 
been without challenge, “[a]t a minimum . . . there is sufficient evi-
dence of state practice to justify the conclusion that the principle, as 
elaborated in the Rio Declaration, reflects a broadly accepted basis 
                                                                                                                    
 128. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 116, princ. 21. 
 129. Id.
 130. Presumably, this language addresses the environment of a State’s own territory 
as well as the territory of other States.  
 131. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 116, princ. 14. 
 132. Id. princ. 13. 
 133. The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9). 
 134. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 114, at 13. 
 135. Id.
 136. Id. Note that few international cases have addressed the issue of damages owed to 
a State that has been harmed. Id. at 20.  
 137. Id. at 21.  
 138. Id. at 20-21; see also Int’l Law Ass’n (ILA), Berlin Conference: Water Resources 
Law, art. 23 cmt. (2004) [hereinafter Berlin Rules], available at 
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/ILA_Berlin_Rules-2004.pdf (“[T]he 
precautionary principle appears in almost all international environmental instruments 
adopted since 1990.”). 
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for international action.”139 In the Rio Declaration, the inclusion of a 
precautionary approach was “unanimously endorsed.”140
 Quite generally, the Precautionary Principle is the concept that 
States have a duty to protect the environment by considering the ef-
fects that development will cause.141 The Precautionary Principle, 
however, does not serve to completely halt and forbid all action that 
will harm the environment.142 Although the Precautionary Principle 
“indeed may impose a ‘no-go’ or a ‘go-slow’ on certain directions of in-
novation and scientific progress . . . , [it] is not based on ‘zero risks’ 
but aims to achieve lower or more acceptable risks or hazards.”143
 Many people fear that such a precautionary approach “may stifle 
innovation or hamper scientific progress.”144 In reality, however, an 
increase in the use of the Precautionary Principle “can help stimulate 
both innovation and science, replacing [outdated] technologies . . . 
with the clean technologies and systems science of a new industrial 
revolution.”145 The result is likely to be an effective balance between 
innovation and the associated harm.146
 Further, Rio Principle 15 also states that “[w]here there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific cer-
tainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.”147 The Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) recognized this duty in the 1997 
                                                                                                                    
 139. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 114, at 22. For a 
critique of whether the Precautionary Principle is indeed customary international law, see 
Jutta Brunnée, The Stockholm Declaration and the Structure and Processes of Internation-
al Environmental Law, in THE STOCKHOLM DECLARATION AND LAW OF THE MARINE 
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 122, at 67, 77, which notes that “doubts linger” as to whether 
the Precautionary Principle is truly customary international law and noting that while “an 
increasing number of observers conclude that the principle is binding custom,” some  
are skeptical and some states claim that there is no legally binding effect to the Precautio-
nary Principle. 
 140. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 114, at 21. 
 141. See Rio Declaration, supra note 117, princ. 15. 
 142. See id.
 143. WORLD COMM’N ON THE ETHICS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND TECH., THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 16 (2005), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/ 
001395/139578e.pdf. The precautionary approach differs from the traditional view of 
“scientific findings” in that the traditional view may have ultimately resulted in the aban-
donment of a project where it was not certain that the project would not result in environ-
mental harm. See INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 114, at 21. 
 144. WORLD COMM’N ON THE ETHICS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND TECH., supra note 
143, at 15. 
 145. Id. at 15-16. 
 146. See id. (“While the [Precautionary Principle] indeed may impose a ‘no-go’ or  
a ‘go-slow’ on certain directions of innovation and scientific progress, the [Precautionary 
Principle] at the same time acts as a stimulant for other innovations and clean technologi-
cal progress.”). 
 147. Rio Declaration, supra note 117, princ. 15. 
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Gab?íkovo-Nagymaros Project Case.148 Though the ICJ shows great 
respect for the environment,149 at the same time it held that a State 
must fulfill its obligations where there is no proof that such activity 
will cause significant harm.150
 The Precautionary Principle does take into consideration the dif-
ferent economic circumstances of States, and thus its application is 
not static.151 Specifically, Rio Principle 15152 provides that “[i]n order 
to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities.”153 This at-
tempts to prevent exploitation of the developing States because they 
are not held to the same standards as thriving developed States.154
 The Principle of Sustainable Development155 is also an important 
international environmental law concept.156 Generally, this principle 
stands for the proposition that States have an obligation to develop 
in a way so as to preserve resources for future generations.157 Specifi-
cally, Rio Principle 3 provides that “[t]he right to development must 
be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental 
needs of present and future generations.”158 Rio Principle 4 details 
how to fulfill this obligation by stating that “to achieve sustainable 
development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral 
part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation 
                                                                                                                    
 148. Case Concerning the Gab?íkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 
7, 42 (Sept. 25).  
 149. Id. at 41 (emphasizing “the great significance that [the ICJ] attaches to respect for 
the environment, not only for States but also for the whole of mankind”). 
 150. See id. at 42 (noting that to fulfill its obligations, Hungary must have “at least 
proven that a real, ‘grave’ and ‘imminent’ ‘peril’ existed . . . and that the measures taken by 
Hungary were the only possible response to it”). 
 151. See Rio Declaration, supra note 117, princ. 15. 
 152. Although the themes of the Rio Declaration are quite similar to the themes pre-
viously addressed by the Stockholm Declaration, the Stockholm Declaration did not ad-
dress the Precautionary Principle. 
 153. Rio Declaration, supra note 117, princ. 15. 
 154. While many sources of international environmental law account for the inability 
of developing countries to comply with certain standards to the same extent of developed 
countries, these are not within the scope of this Comment. 
 155. Rio Declaration, supra note 117, princ. 4. 
 156. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 121, at 200 (noting that since the Rio Declaration, 
the Principle of Sustainable Development “has received nearly universal acceptance . . . 
among every sector of international society” and that the concept has been included in 
many international environmental declarations and treaties).
 157. See id.
 158. Rio Declaration, supra note 117, princ. 3. 
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from it.”159 This principle does not prevent development; rather it re-
quires that each State approach development in a certain way.160
 Conjunctively, the Precautionary Principle and Principle of Sus-
tainable Development show that States have an obligation to use en-
vironmental effects as a consideration, not as a determinative factor, 
in whether to move forward with construction and development 
projects (including hydroelectric dam projects, among others). Where 
a State has knowledge that extreme environmental consequences are 
certain to result from a considered development, then both principles 
would likely say to not move forward. 
 Yet, where such environmental consequences are not certain to 
result—even if only because the scientific evidence is not determina-
tive or complete—the Precautionary Principle advises to continue but 
at a slower, more careful pace. This slowed continuation would also 
be in conformance with the Principle of Sustainable Development be-
cause moving at a slower rate would contribute to preservation of en-
vironmental resources for future generations. Because of this rela-
tionship, when a State formulates its development approach  
in compliance with the Precautionary Principle, it is much more like-
ly to also comply with the requirements of the Principle of Sustaina-
ble Development.161
 Neither the Precautionary Principle nor the Principle of Sustain-
able Development gives mention to territorial boundaries.162 Thus, 
arguably, the two principles obligate a State to consider the effect of 
projects generally, including the impacts on other States, as opposed 
to only the impact on its own current environment.163 Likewise, nei-
ther the Precautionary Principle nor the Principle of Sustainable De-
velopment applies solely to one resource or issue within the context 
of international environmental law,164 and thus both principles are 
applicable to a State’s construction and use of hydroelectric dams. 
                                                                                                                    
 159. Id. princ. 4. The Rio Declaration also recognized that developing and developed 
countries should not be held to the same standards, stating that “[t]he developed countries 
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable 
development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of 
the technologies and financial resources they command.” Id. princ. 7. 
 160. See id. princ. 3.
 161. Another view of the relationship between these principles is that the Principle of 
Sustainable Development is a balance between the well-established Right to Develop and 
the Precautionary Principle. Brian Trevor Hodges, Where the Grass Is Always Greener: 
Foreign Investor Actions Against Environmental Regulations Under NAFTA’s Chapter 11, 
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, 14 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 367, 393-94 (2002).  
 162. See, e.g., Rio Declaration, supra note 117, princs. 3, 4, 15. 
 163. See generally id.
 164. See id. princs. 3, 15. 
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 (c)   States’ Duty to Cooperate 
 General sources of international environmental law also provide 
that States have a duty to cooperate with each other; such coopera-
tion is paramount to the adherence to other broad themes of interna-
tional environmental law.165 This duty is considered customary in-
ternational law.166 Principle 25 of the Rio Declaration provides a clear 
and concise statement of this duty. Specifically, the principle pro-
vides that “[p]eace, development and environmental protection are 
interdependent and indivisible.”167 Without peace between States, 
there can be no successful movement toward environmental preser-
vation; peace itself cannot result unless States are willing to coope-
rate. For example, Stockholm Principle 24 provides that 
“[i]nternational matters concerning the protection and improvement 
of the environment should be handled in a co-operative spirit by all
countries, big or small, on an equal footing.”168
 Rio Principle 12 further provides that States should make all ef-
forts to achieve international consensus for environmental concerns 
by stating that “[u]nilateral actions to deal with environmental chal-
lenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be 
avoided. Environmental measures addressing transboundary or 
global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on 
an international consensus.”169 Less abstract, and more direct, is 
Stockholm Principle 24, which stresses the duty of governments to 
cooperate “through multilateral or bilateral arrangements, or other 
appropriate means” for the purpose of controlling, reducing, or oth-
erwise eliminating adverse environmental effects.170
 In 1957, even before the Stockholm Declaration set forth this 
principle, the Lake Lanoux Arbitration stressed notice.171 The panel 
in Lake Lanoux “held that as a matter of customary international 
law, a State that is engaging in behavior likely to significantly im-
                                                                                                                    
 165. See, e.g., id. princ. 25; see also Kiss, supra note 123, at 55 (noting that the Stock-
holm Declaration’s philosophy is expressed in large part in Principles 24 and 25, “inviting 
States to cooperate in international matters concerning the protection and improvement of 
the environment”). 
 166. See PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 461 
(2d. ed. 2003). 
 167. Rio Declaration, supra note 117, princ. 25. Likewise, Rio Principle 26 holds that 
“environmental disputes” should be handled “peacefully and by appropriate means in ac-
cordance with the Charter of the United Nations.” Id. princ. 26. 
 168. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 116, princ. 24 (emphasis added). 
 169. Rio Declaration, supra note 117, princ. 12. Rio Principle 12 further ties in the 
Principle of Sustainable Development by stating the following: “States should cooperate to 
promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to economic 
growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better address the problems of en-
vironmental degradation.” Id.
 170. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 116, princ. 24. 
 171. See generally Lake Lanoux Arbitration, 12 INT’L ARB. AWARDS 281, 315-16 (1957). 
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pact the environment of another State is obliged to involve the af-
fected State in discussions regarding these activities.”172
B.   Sources of Transboundary Water Law 
 Sources of international law specifically addressing transboun-
dary watercourses did not appear until approximately the 1950s.173
Prior to that, some sources did exist, such as nongovernmental reso-
lutions, and sources specific to particular regions had not yet re-
ceived international application.174 Multiple theories addressing the 
relationship between riparian States with regard to transboundary 
water rights have prevailed, depending on the particular time pe-
riod.175 However, after a brief overview of the relevant sources of law, 
this Section will focus primarily on the equitable utilization theory, 
as it has become the “cornerstone” of international water law. The 
available sources of international law, at least in part, adhere to  
this theory.176
1.   Relevant Sources 
 The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International 
Rivers were adopted by the International Law Association (ILA) in 
1967 after the ILA’s fifty-second conference, which was held in Hel-
sinki, Finland in 1966.177 While these rules provide valuable informa-
tion specifically applicable to international rivers, one major downfall 
                                                                                                                    
 172. Hodges, supra note 161, at 393-94 (citation omitted).
 173. Surya P. Subedi, Regulation of Shared Water Resources in International Law: The 
Challenge of Balancing Competing Demands, in INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES LAW FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY: THE CASE OF THE RIVER GANGES BASIN 7, 8 (Surya P. Subedi ed., 2005).
 174. Id. at 8-9. 
 175. See id. at 9. 
 176. See, e.g., Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses (1997) [hereinafter UN Convention], available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/ 
texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf (adopted by General Assembly Resolu-
tion Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, G.A. 
Res. 51/229, art. 5, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 99th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/229 (May 
21, 1997)). 
 177. Int’l Law Ass’n [ILA], Fifty-Second Conference, Helsinki Fin., Aug. 14-20, 1966, 
The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers (Aug. 1966) [hereinaf-
ter Helsinki Rules], available at http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/ 
intldocs/helsinki_rules.html. After the Helsinki Rules were adopted in 1966, the ILA then 
drafted multiple sets of rules to different water-related activities that were not specifically 
addressed in the Helsinki Rules. Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Berlin Rules on Water Re-
sources: The New Paradigm for International Water Law, in WORLD ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
WATER RESOURCES CONGRESS 2006: EXAMINING THE CONFLUENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
AND WATER CONCERNS (American Society of Civil Engineers CD-ROM) (Randall Graham 
ed., 2006) [hereinafter Dellapenna, The Berlin Rules], available at http://www.ualg.pt/ 
5cigpa/comunicacoes/Berlin Rules Summary.doc. These included: “flood control (1972), pol-
lution (1972, 1982), navigability (1974), the protection of water installations during armed 
conflicts (1976), joint administration (1976, 1986), flowage regulation (1980), general envi-
ronmental management concerns (1980), groundwater (1986), cross-media pollution (1996), 
and remedies (1996).” Id. at 4. 
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is that these rules were not endorsed by the United Nations—the 
ILA is a nongovernmental body that is not affiliated with the UN.178
Also important is that while the Helsinki Rules are relevant to the 
issue of hydroelectric dams, they were not created as a multilateral 
treaty, and thus the rules are not binding on any States.179
 In 1997, the International Law Commission (ILC) of the United 
Nations incorporated themes from the Helsinki Rules into its Con-
vention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses.180 The UN Convention was approved by 103 States at 
the Convention, but has still not come into force.181 Article 36 of the 
UN Convention requires that thirty-five States ratify, accept, ap-
prove, or accede, and when the thirty-fifth instrument does this, the 
UN Convention will come into force.182 As of May 2009, only sixteen 
States had become signatories and seventeen states had ratified, ac-
cepted, approved, or acceded.183 While the allotted time for ratifica-
tion expired in May 2000, some States that did accede did so after 
the May 2000 deadline;184 States are thus still presumably permitted 
to accede.185 Therefore, the UN Convention may at some point come 
into force.186
 Before the UN Convention’s adoption in 1997, “the international 
community did not have at its disposal a set of written rules and 
principles endorsed by a political arena. Up until this time, the Hel-
sinki Rules . . . were the only set of written rules to be referred to,”187
                                                                                                                    
 178. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, The UN Convention on International Water-
courses: Prospects for an Unfinished Agenda for Co-Management, 
http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/maksoud/water98/present7.htm#Chazournes (last visited 
June 1, 2009). Although not affiliated with the United Nations, the ILA is well known for 
“the articulation of cogent and compelling statements of the customary international law 
relating to fresh water resources.” Berlin Rules, supra note 138, at 2 (“Working over a span 
of nearly 50 years, the Association has produced a series of rules addressing various topics 
relating to the overall field of international water law.”). 
 179. See generally Helsinki Rules, supra note 177. 
 180. UN Convention, supra note 176.  
 181. STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES: NON-
NAVIGATIONAL USES 315 (2001); Press Release, United Nations, General Assembly Adopts 
Convention on Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, GA/9248 
(May 21, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1997/19970521.ga9248.html. 
 182. UN Convention, supra note 176, art. 36. 
 183. United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Sta-
tus as of 13 May 2009, Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of Interna-
tional Watercourses, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume II/ 
Chapter XXVII/XXVII-12.en.pdf (last visited June 1, 2009) [hereinafter Multilateral Trea-
ties Deposited with the Secretary-General]. Ratifying, accepting, acceding, and approving 
States include: Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahi-
riya, Namibia, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, South Africa, Sweden, Syrian Arab 
Republic, Tunisia, and Uzbekistan. Id.
 184. Id.
 185. See id.
 186. See id; see also MCCAFFREY, supra note 181, at 315.
 187. de Chazournes, supra note 178. 
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and it was debatable as to whether the Helsinki Rules actually “con-
stituted customary law.”188 Note, however, that the Helsinki Rules 
seem to, overall, be considered customary international law.189 In 
1997, the very same year in which the UN Convention was adopted, 
the International Court of Justice in the Gab?íkovo-Nagymoros 
Project Case190 referred to the Convention “as expressing, at least in 
part, contemporary customary international law governing interna-
tionally shared waters.”191 Even though the UN Convention has not 
been ratified, one argument is that “the success of the Convention 
does not depend on whether it enters into force. Its influence is more 
likely to derive from its status as the most authoritative statement of 
general principles and rules governing the non-navigational uses of 
international watercourses.”192 Further, the UN Convention is likely 
to “remain highly influential and persuasive as a statement of cur-
rent customary and general international law on watercourses as it 
is the culmination of over 20 years of in-depth research by the Inter-
national Law Commission into the state of international watercourse 
law and practice.”193
 Recognition is also due to the Berlin Rules, the ILA’s 2004 revi-
sion of the Helsinki Rules.194 Arguably, “[t]he Berlin Rules set forth a 
clear, cogent, and coherent summary of the relevant customary in-
ternational law, incorporating the experience of the nearly four dec-
ades since the Helsinki Rules were adopted.”195
 There are a couple of important differences in the scope of the 
Berlin Rules in comparison to both the Helsinki Rules and the UN 
Convention. One significant difference is that the Berlin Rules do not 
                                                                                                                    
 188. Id. Widely accepted, however, is the claim that the Helsinki Rules are customary 
international law. See, e.g., Dellapenna, The Berlin Rules, supra note 177, at 1 (arguing 
that “[t]he Helsinki Rules quickly came to be seen as the authoritative summary of the cus-
tomary international law on transboundary or internationally shared waters”). But see Li-
sa M. Jacobs, Sharing the Gifts of the Nile: Establishment of a Legal Régime for Nile Wa-
ters Management, 7 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 95, 101 (1993) (“The Helsinki Rules are not 
an international convention. Nor are they a treaty, since they do not represent particular 
states’ agreement among themselves to the principles expressed. The Helsinki Rules are 
not customary law. Insufficient state practice exists to show the Rules’ widespread accep-
tance, and no evidence indicates that states feel bound to follow these Rules.”). 
 189. Joseph W. Dellapenna, International Law’s Lessons for the Law of the Lakes, 40 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 747, 762 (2007). 
 190. See Case Concerning the Gab?íkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 
I.C.J. 7, 42 (Sept. 25). 
 191. Berlin Rules, supra note 138, at 3. 
 192. Stephen McCaffrey, The Contribution of the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 1 INT’L J. GLOBAL ENVTL. ISSUES
250, 250 (2001). 
 193. Owen McIntyre, The Role of Customary Rules and Principles of International En-
vironmental Law in the Protection of Shared International Freshwater Resources, 46 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 157, 160 n.2 (2006).
 194. See generally Berlin Rules, supra note 138. 
 195. Dellapenna, The Berlin Rules, supra note 177, at 6. 
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solely focus on international waters.196 Instead, their focus includes 
national waters “to the extent that customary international law 
speaks to those waters.”197 Likewise, the Berlin Rules focus on 
ground waters in addition to surface waters.198 Rapporteur for the 
Berlin Rules, Joseph W. Dellapenna, stated in reference to these 
rules that the inclusion of these matters within this single set of 
rules allows 
a lawyer, a jurist, a water manager, a water policy maker, or any-
one else concerned by the rules of customary international [law] 
pertaining to water [to], for the first time, find all the relevant 
rules in one place, with attention to the interrelationships of the 
rules as well as to their clear statement.199
 The next subsection will emphasize discrepancies between the 
Helsinki Rules, the UN Convention, and the Berlin Rules. Addition-
ally, this Section will occasionally offer the author’s opinion regard-
ing the language and importance of the contents of each of  
these sources. 
2.   Relevant Themes 
 (a)   Equitable Utilization 
 Currently, the theory of equitable utilization is at the “corner-
stone” of international law regarding transboundary watercourses,200
and “[t]here is little contention that equitable utilisation is a well-
established principle of customary international water law.”201
 Equitable utilization202 can be viewed as an integration and com-
promise between two previous theories, the doctrine of absolute sove-
reignty and the doctrine of territorial integrity.203 Briefly, the doc-
trine of absolute sovereignty would allow an upper riparian State to 
do as it wishes with the transboundary watercourse flowing through 
its country regardless of the harm caused to the lower riparian 
                                                                                                                    
 196. See id.
 197. Id.
 198. Id. at 5-6. 
 199. Id. at 6-7. 
 200. Subedi, supra note 173, at 9. 
 201. Simon Nicholson, Water Scarcity, Conflict, and International Water Law: An Ex-
amination of the Regime Established by the UN Convention on International Watercourses,
5 N.Z. J. ENVTL. L. 91, 113 (2001). 
 202. “Equitability has been understood . . . to mean not division into equal portions, 
but the equality of right to use the water for beneficial purposes.” Sharif S. Elmusa, Har-
monizing Equitable Utilization and Significant Harm: Comments on the 1997 ILC Conven-
tion, Conference on “Water, Dispute Prevention and Development: South Perspectives,” 
Presented at the Center for the Global South, American Univ. (Oct. 12-13, 1998), 
http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/maksoud/water98/present7.htm#El-Musa.
 203. See Dellapenna, The Berlin Rules, supra note 177, at 3. 
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State.204 Conversely, the doctrine of territorial integrity may be used 
by a lower riparian State to claim that it has a right to a “fair share” 
of the water within the transboundary watercourse to “meet its exist-
ing and potential use.”205
 The Helsinki Rules “crystallized and codified” the well-established 
use of equitable utilization, albeit by using slightly different phrase-
ology.206 Specifically, Article IV of the Helsinki Rules states that 
“[e]ach basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable 
and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an interna-
tional drainage basin.”207
 The UN Convention addresses equitable utilization in Articles 5 
and 6.208 Importantly, notice that compared to the Helsinki Rules, 
the UN Convention’s language is substantially longer and includes a 
new focus. In particular, Article 5.2 includes for the first time (other 
than individual treaties created between States) the idea of partici-
pation in achieving equitable and reasonable use:
1. Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an 
international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. 
In particular, an international watercourse shall be used and de-
veloped by watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal 
and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking 
into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, 
consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse. 
2. Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development 
and protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and 
reasonable manner. Such participation includes both the right to 
utilize the watercourse and the duty to cooperate in the protection 
and development thereof, as provided in the present Convention.209
 Both the Helsinki Rules Article V and the UN Convention Article 
6 provide ways to determine what is meant by equitable and reason-
able use.210 Each of these sections includes a list of factors and pro-
vides that States must consider all relevant sources equally and “on 
the basis of the whole.”211 While this flexibility is beneficial in the 
sense that it leaves room to account for States’ particular circums-
tances and the uniqueness of particular regions and watercourses, it 
may, for practical purposes, prove to be quite a complication. In prac-
tice, an analyst applying these factors may find this flexibility bur-
densome and lacking of sufficient guidance to determine whether a 
                                                                                                                    
 204. Id.; see also Subedi, supra note 173, at 9. 
 205. Subedi, supra note 173, at 9 (citation omitted). 
 206. Dellapenna, The Berlin Rules, supra note 177, at 3. 
 207. Helsinki Rules, supra note 177, art. IV (emphasis added).
 208. UN Convention, supra note 176, arts. 5, 6. 
 209. Id. art. 5. 
 210. UN Convention, supra note 176, art. 6; Helsinki Rules, supra note 177, art. V. 
 211. UN Convention, supra note 176, art. 6; Helsinki Rules, supra note 177, art. V. 
514 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:487 
use, such as hydroelectric dam construction, is actually an equitable 
and reasonable use of a particular transboundary watercourse.212 Ar-
ticle 9 offers some help to analysts through its requirement that 
States provide each other, on a regular basis, with relevant informa-
tion.213 This requirement at least ensures that States have current, 
relevant information on hand when making a determination.214
 Recognizing the necessity for overall protection of the water-
course, Article 8 provides that “[w]atercourse States shall cooperate 
on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual bene-
fit and good faith in order to attain optimal utilization and adequate 
protection of an international watercourse.”215 Arguably, the use of 
the word “optimal” combined with the specification of “watercourse” 
makes clear that an equitable and reasonable use is based on what is 
equitable and reasonable for the watercourse as a whole rather than 
simply a State’s equitable and reasonable use of that portion of the 
watercourse flowing through its territory.
 (i)   UN Convention Article 5 and General Principles of Interna-
tional Environmental Law 
 Article 5 of the UN Convention can be viewed as incorporating 
several important customary international law principles. Similar to 
Stockholm Principle 21, a State is permitted to use transboundary 
watercourses within its territories, but is precluded from doing so in 
a way that harms another State.216
 Additionally, “to be equitable and reasonable, the use must also be 
consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse.”217 This can 
be viewed as representing the broad themes of both the Precautio-
nary Principle and Principle of Sustainable Development. Specifical-
ly, in order to protect the watercourse, a precautionary approach will 
be necessary. For example, a State would not know for certain that it 
is adhering to this protection requirement unless it moves more slow-
ly in order to further investigate the effects of the dam, thereby ad-
hering to a precautionary approach. Further, by taking such a pre-
cautionary approach, the State is much more likely to be in com-
pliance with the overall Principle of Sustainable Development, as 
such protection will preserve the watercourse for future generations.
                                                                                                                    
 212. Elmusa, supra note 202 (claiming that such an analyst will face difficulties “for 
two reasons: one is that individual factors lack specificity as to meaning and, the second, is 
that multiplicity of the factors and lack of assigning weights to each diminish their value 
as a practical tool”). 
 213. McCaffrey, supra note 192, at 253. 
 214. Id.
 215. UN Convention, supra note 176, art. 8 (emphasis added). 
 216. See id. art. 5.  
 217. McCaffrey, supra note 192, at 253. 
2009]                          HYDROELECTRIC DAMS 515 
 (b)   No Significant Harm 
 It is well established in international law and specifically set forth 
in Stockholm Principle 21 (and Rio Principle 2) that States may not 
exploit their own resources to such a point so as to cause damage to 
other States.218 This concept is included in the doctrine of no signifi-
cant harm.219 While the Helsinki Rules principally focused on equita-
ble utilization with no focus on the idea of no significant harm, the 
UN Convention focuses on both.220 The concept of no significant harm 
is codified in Article 7 of the UN Convention: 
1. Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international water-
course in their territories, take all appropriate measures to pre-
vent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States. 
2. Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another wa-
tercourse State, the States whose use causes such harm shall, in 
the absence of agreement to such use, take all appropriate meas-
ures, having due regard for the provisions of articles 5 and 6, in 
consultation with the affected State, to eliminate or mitigate  
such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the question  
of compensation.221
 (c)   Competing Doctrines Within the UN Convention?: Equitable 
 Utilization Versus No Significant Harm 
 A major difficulty with the UN Convention is the “clash” between 
equitable utilization (Article 5) and no significant harm (Article 7).222
This clash resulted in debate both during and after drafting regard-
ing whether equitable utilization or no significant harm holds prece-
dence.223 This determination is crucial because, on one hand, if 
“equitable utilization” is deemed to take precedence, then so long as 
an upstream riparian State’s actions are equitable and reasonable, 
significant harm may eventually still be caused to the downstream 
riparian State.224 On the other hand, if “no significant harm” is 
deemed to take precedence, then an upstream riparian State is not 
permitted to even an equitable and reasonable use of the transboun-
dary watercourse, if that will cause significant harm to the down-
stream riparian State.225 For these reasons, upstream riparian States 
                                                                                                                    
 218. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 116, princ. 21.
 219. See UN Convention, supra note 176, art. 7. 
 220. See id. arts. 5, 7. 
 221. Id. art. 7. 
 222. Nicholson, supra note 201, at 116-17.  
 223. Id.
 224. Id. at 117.  
 225. Id.
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are in favor of the equitable utilization principle and downstream ri-
parian owners are in favor of the no significant harm principle.226
 Negotiations during drafting eventually resulted in a compromise; 
however, “the balance reached between articles 5 and 7 can best be 
described as ‘tantalisingly obscure.’ ”227 Unfortunately, the adopted 
draft, even after extensive negotiations, still presents problems be-
tween whether equitable utilization or no significant harm prevails.228
 Although some may view the issue as unresolved by the UN Con-
vention, careful inspection of the phrasing of the UN Convention 
strongly suggests that equitable utilization is favored over no sub-
stantial harm. Article 7 addresses a State’s responsibility to cause no 
significant harm to another State.229 However, Article 7.1 includes 
the language “take all appropriate measures,” and 7.2 includes the 
statement “having due regard for the provisions of articles 5 and 6,” 
which are the very articles addressing equal utilization.230 Further-
more, Article 10 provides that “[i]n the event of a conflict,” the con-
flict “shall be resolved with reference to articles 5 to 7.”231 Based on 
these statements, one can easily conclude that no significant harm 
certainly does not prevail over equitable utilization. Supporting this 
conclusion is a relevant example used by McCaffrey regarding the in-
clusion of these statements:  
This would presumably mean that if State A’s hydroelectric use 
conflicts with State B’s agricultural use, the conflict is not to be re-
solved solely by applying the ‘no-harm’ rule of Article 7, but rather 
through reference to the ‘package’ of articles setting forth the prin-
ciples of both equitable utilisation and ‘no-harm.’232
 The Berlin Rules attempt to eliminate controversy between equit-
able utilization and no significant harm by adopting the following 
language in Article 12:  
1. Basin States shall in their respective territories manage the wa-
ters of an international drainage basin in an equitable and reason-
able manner having due regard for the obligation not to cause sig-
nificant harm to other basin States. 
2. In particular, basin States shall develop and use the waters of 
the basin in order to attain the optimal and sustainable use the-
reof and benefits therefrom, taking into account the interests  
                                                                                                                    
 226. Id. at 116-17.  
 227. Id. at 117 (citation omitted). 
 228. See id.
 229. UN Convention, supra note 176, art. 7. 
 230. Id.
 231. Id. art. 10. 
 232. McCaffrey, supra note 192, at 255. 
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of other basin States, consistent with adequate protection of  
the waters.233
This phrasing “emphasizes that the right to an equitable and reason-
able share of the waters of an international drainage basin carries 
with it certain duties in the use of those waters.”234 Similar to both 
the Helsinki Rules and the UN Convention, the Berlin Rules include 
factors to determine whether a use, such as the construction and use 
of a hydroelectric dam, is an equitable and reasonable use of a trans-
boundary watercourse.235 However, the Berlin Rules emphasize sus-
tainability and prevention of environmental harm by adding two ad-
ditional factors.236
 (d)   States’ Duty to Cooperate 
 It is widely recognized that “[t]he duty of cooperation is the most 
basic principle underlying international water law.”237 Without State 
cooperation, it would ultimately prove impossible for States to fulfill 
obligations prescribed to them through the many sources of interna-
tional law.238 Article 6 of the UN Convention provides that “water-
course States concerned shall, when the need arises, enter into con-
sultations in a spirit of cooperation.”239
 Article 8 further provides that in States’ determinations regarding 
the manner of cooperation, “watercourse States may consider the es-
tablishment of joint mechanisms or commissions.”240 While this is 
merely a suggestion, as it uses the word “consider,” many scholars 
deem this ideal.241 This proposition is the best approach because use 
of a joint mechanism will assist when two riparian states disagree as 
to what activities will provide “ ‘optimal utilisation and adequate 
protection.’ ”242 Such a joint mechanism will allow individuals from 
                                                                                                                    
 233. Berlin Rules, supra note 138, art. 12. 
 234. Id. art. 12 cmt. 
 235. See id. art. 13.  
 236. Id. (adding “[t]he sustainability of proposed or existing uses” and “[t]he minimiza-
tion of environmental harm” to its list of factors). 
 237. Id. art. 11 cmts. (noting that in addition to the Berlin Rules, the Helsinki Rules 
and other international environmental law documents recognize this rule).  
 238. See id.
 239. UN Convention, supra note 176, art. 6. The UN Convention furthers its emphasis 
on participation by including this statement within the same article (Article 5) in which it 
lists the elements. Id. art. 5. 
240. Id. art. 8. Indeed, a paragraph was added to Article 8 of the UN Convention re-
garding the use of joint mechanisms or commissions because “delegations negotiating the 
Convention attached such a significance to cooperation through joint mechanisms.” 
McCaffrey, supra note 192, at 253; see, e.g., infra Part VI.A. (explaining the creation of the 
International Joint Commission between the United States and Canada).
 241. See, e.g., McCaffrey, supra note 192, at 253. 
 242. Id. (quoting UN Convention, supra note 176, art. 8). 
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each State to mutually determine whether the States should permit 
certain uses of the transboundary watercourse. 
 Article 9 also states that “watercourse States shall on a regular 
basis exchange readily available data and information on the condi-
tion of the watercourse.”243 This contributes to the requirement for 
State cooperation because without cooperation, it would be impossi-
ble to provide each other with this required information. Additional-
ly, Article 10’s statement that “no use of an international water-
course enjoys inherent priority over other uses,” except where 
agreement or custom specifies otherwise, also shows that States 
must work together to determine the equitable and reasonable uses of 
a watercourse, rather than one State assuming and declaring that its 
use has priority.244
 (e)   Dispute Avoidance and Settlement 
 The Helsinki Rules, the UN Convention, and the Berlin Rules all 
provide information regarding prevention of disputes, and since dis-
putes are many times inevitable, these sources also provide dispute 
resolution information for use when disputes actually occur.245 Be-
cause all three sources provide relatively similar provisions, dispute 
resolution information is not a main focus of this Comment. It should 
be noted, however, that the inclusion of this information in agree-
ments regarding transboundary watercourses and hydroelectric 
dams is especially important as it ensures that a harmed party will 
have a mechanism for legal enforcement. 
                                                                                                                    
 243. UN Convention, supra note 176, art. 9. 
 244. Id. art. 10.  
 245. See generally UN Convention, supra note 176, arts. 11-19, 30, 33, annex arts. 1-14; 
Berlin Rules, supra note 138, arts. 56-73; Helsinki Rules, supra note 177, arts. XXVI-
XXXVII. UN Convention Part III, entitled Planned Measures, sets forth a framework for 
avoiding and handling disputes between watercourse States. See UN Convention, supra
note 176, arts. 11-18, 33. Article 12, requiring notice, provides that before implementing 
“planned measures which may have a significant adverse effect upon other watercourse 
States,” the State is required to give those States “timely notification.” Id. art. 12. This no-
tification should include technical data and results from environmental impact statements. 
Id. This information should be given “in order to enable the notified States to evaluate the 
possible effects of the planned measures.” Id. The UN Convention Article 13 then specifies 
a time period for reply to notification, obligations of the notifying state during the reply pe-
riod, information regarding the reply to the notification, and information regarding an ab-
sence of reply to notification. Id. art. 13. Article 17 addresses consultations and negotia-
tions, further showing the importance of State cooperation. See id. art. 17. 
 For those situations in which one State fails to give notice to another affected State, 
Article 18 provides procedures for the absence of notification. Id. art. 18. It states that 
where one “watercourse State has reasonable grounds to believe that another watercourse 
State is planning measures that may have a significant adverse effect upon it,” the affected 
State may request the planning State to comply with Article 12, by giving such notification 
of harm. Id. Article 33 specifically addresses settlement of inevitable disputes. See id. art. 33. 
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 (f)   Additional Relevant Articles of the UN Convention 
 (i)   Ecosystems and Marine Environment 
 As discussed previously, the effects of hydroelectric dam construc-
tion can affect rivers and the supported ecosystems immensely. The 
UN Convention includes specific language addressing ecosystems 
that is directly relevant to hydroelectric dams.246 Article 20 provides 
that “[w]atercourse States shall, individually and, where appropri-
ate, jointly, protect and preserve the ecosystems of international wa-
tercourses.”247 Likewise, Article 23 of the UN Convention specifically 
addresses the duty of watercourse States to “take all measures with 
respect to an international watercourse that are necessary to protect 
and preserve the marine environment, including estuaries, taking in-
to account generally accepted international rules and standards.”248
In a sense, these UN Convention articles enhance the widely ac-
cepted Principle of Sustainable Development but on a more focused 
issue directly applicable to transboundary watercourses. 
 (ii)   Hydraulic Works 
 The UN Convention also incorporated language specifically appli-
cable to “regulation” of the natural flows of transboundary water-
courses by stating in Article 25 that “[w]atercourse States shall coo-
perate, where appropriate, to respond to needs or opportunities for 
regulation” and that “[u]nless otherwise agreed, watercourse States 
shall participate on an equitable basis in the construction and main-
tenance or defrayal of the costs of such regulation works.”249
 In addition to general consultation requirements set forth for 
transboundary watercourses in Article 24,250 Article 26 includes con-
sultations directly applying to one State being harmed by the instal-
lations of another State. Article 26.2 provides the following: 
Watercourse States shall, at the request of any of them which has 
reasonable grounds to believe that it may suffer significant ad-
verse effects, enter into consultations with regard to: 
                                                                                                                    
 246. See UN Convention, supra note 176, art. 20. 
 247. Id.
 248. Id. art. 23. 
 249. Id. art 25. Article 25 defines “regulation” as “the use of hydraulic works or any 
other continuing measure to alter, vary or otherwise control the flow of the waters of an in-
ternational watercourse.” Id.
 250. Id. art. 24. Article 24.1 provides that “[w]atercourse States shall, at the request of 
any of them, enter into consultations concerning the management of an international wa-
tercourse, which may include the establishment of a joint management mechanism.” Id. 
Article 24.2 further provides that “ ‘management’ refers, in particular, to: (a) Planning the 
sustainable development of an international watercourse and providing for the implemen-
tation of any plans adopted; and (b) Otherwise promoting the rational and optimal utiliza-
tion, protection and control of the watercourse.” Id.
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(a) The safe operation and maintenance of installations, facilities 
or other works related to an international watercourse; and  
(b) The protection of installations, facilities or other works from 
wilful or negligent acts or the forces of nature.251
V.   ENFORCEMENT AND ITS COMPLICATIONS
A.   Legal Enforcement 
 While various mechanisms exist to address problems and dis-
putes, a major impediment is enforcement.252 This Section will focus 
on several enforcement deficiencies with regard to the sources of in-
ternational environmental law relevant to the construction and use 
of hydroelectric dams. 
1. Relevant Law Is Nonbinding 
 One common enforcement problem is that often the relevant in-
ternational law is simply not binding, and where the law is nonbind-
ing, a harmed State has no mechanism to force the harming State to 
comply.253 This may arise either because the relevant international 
law is a nonbinding source that is not considered to be customary in-
ternational law and thus binding on no States or because the rele-
vant binding sources are not binding on the particular State causing 
the harm.254
 While the Helsinki Rules and the UN Convention provide en-
forcement provisions specifically relevant to disputes resulting from 
hydroelectric dam construction and use,255 these sources are not nec-
essarily binding. The Helsinki Rules are likely widely considered cus-
tomary international law, in which case they are binding.256 Howev-
er, the UN Convention, while continuously gaining acceptance and 
                                                                                                                    
 251. Id. art. 26. 
 252. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 114, at 14. 
 253. See id. at 14-15. 
 254. See id.
 255. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 256. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text. Article XXX of the Helsinki Rules 
provides that “[i]n case of a dispute between States as to their legal rights or other inter-
ests,” negotiation should be sought. Helsinki Rules, supra note 177, art. XXX. If both states 
consider the problem to be “incapable of resolution,” then Article XXXII “recommend[s] 
that they seek the good offices, or jointly request the mediation of a third State, of a quali-
fied international organization or of a qualified person.” Id. art. XXXII. One such example 
is the creation of the International Joint Commission by the United States and Canada to 
handle such disputes. See infra Part VI.A. Further, where such states are still unsuccess-
ful at resolving their problems, then Article XXXIII “recommend[s] that they form a com-
mission of inquiry or an ad hoc conciliation commission,” which will try to “find a solution, 
likely to be accepted by the States concerned, of any dispute as to their legal rights.” Hel-
sinki Rules, supra note 177, art. XXXIII. As a last resort, Article XXXIV “recommend[s] 
that the States concerned agree to submit their legal disputes to an ad hoc arbitral tribun-
al, to a permanent arbitral tribunal or to the International Court of Justice.” Id.  
art. XXXIV. 
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having the UN’s endorsement, has not come into force and is not yet 
considered customary international law and thus binds no State to 
its framework of enforcement mechanisms.257
 Should the UN Convention eventually come into force, assuming 
it would not yet be widely accepted as customary international law, it 
will only bind those States that ratify it.258 Additionally, the UN Con-
vention is meant to solely be a framework—used as a starting point 
for States with such transboundary watercourse issues to build upon 
when generating their own agreements.259
2.   No Attached Enforcement Mechanism 
 A second major impediment to enforcement—presuming that re-
levant international law is binding upon the harming State—is that 
there is not always an enforcement mechanism attached to the appli-
cable law, and if there is, there is not always a way to force the harm-
ing party to submit to that mechanism. This is the classic problem 
with customary international law principles, as they do not typically 
define “required behavior.”260 Instead,  
these rules state international duties that are too vague to provide 
any guidance about what behavior is acceptable or to facilitate 
ready application of these rules to specific disputes. When public-
ists endow these abstract duties with substantive content and at-
tempt to generate determinate outcomes for future disputes, they 
inevitably privilege the interests of some states over others.261
Further, many States, especially developing nations, “refuse to con-
sider themselves bound by rules of customary international law, 
however determinate the rules may be.”262 Thus, while Stockholm 
Principle 21,263 the duty of States to cooperate,264 and likely the Pre-
cautionary Principle265 are customary international law and are 
therefore binding, a harmed State may have no authority to force the 
harming State to a particular, or any, enforcement mechanism.  
 Even the International Court of Justice does not have the power 
to force a State to submit to its jurisdiction.266 Thus, in order to es-
                                                                                                                    
 257. See supra notes 181-86 and accompanying text. 
 258. Scott Barrett, International Cooperation and the International Commons, 10 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 131, 139 (“A country only needs to comply with a treaty to 
which it is a party.”). 
 259. See generally UN Convention, supra note 176. 
 260. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 114, at 15.
 261. Id.
 262. Id.
 263. See supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text. 
 264. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text. 
 265. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text. 
 266. See Aloysius P. Llamzon, Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the 
International Court of Justice, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 815 (2007). 
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tablish ICJ jurisdiction over a State, the State must either have vo-
luntarily submitted to the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction or have 
agreed in a treaty that in the event of dispute the parties would 
submit the case to the ICJ.267
 To minimize the problem of no available mechanism to force a 
harming State to submit to a particular mechanism, many treaties, 
both multilateral and bilateral, provide enforcement mechanisms 
that are binding on the party States.268 Ideally, transboundary States 
will choose to create treaties for transboundary waters and, more 
specifically, when a hydroelectric dam project is proposed for that 
river. These treaties prove beneficial, when drafted properly, because 
they can incorporate—and essentially codify—general principles, 
such as the Precautionary Principle, and relevant international wa-
tercourse law, such as the UN Convention. Use of such incorporation 
to address the construction and use of hydroelectric dams will ideally 
include enforcement mechanisms. When these enforcement mechan-
isms are incorporated into a treaty, in times of dispute, party States 
are then required to submit to that mechanism and consider the ren-
dered decision binding. 
3.   Rendered Decision May Not Mean that the Problem Is Solved 
 A third enforcement problem is that even when States adhere to 
their duties of cooperation during a dispute and thus submit their 
case to the mechanism they previously designated through agree-
ment, the eventual rendered decision may not always resolve  
the dispute.269
B.   Nonlegal Forms of Enforcement 
 Realistically, because of these enforcement deficiencies, many 
times a harming State may halt or change its activities not based on 
the enforcement of an international environmental law, but through 
other nonlegal mechanisms. One general principle is the idea of reci-
procity.270 A harming State may determine that although a certain 
action would be a good economic decision for the State, taking such 
an action will then leave open the door, and in a sense encourage, 
other States to take the same action.271 Thus, a State may determine 
                                                                                                                    
267. See id. at 844; see also infra Part VI.C. (demonstrating the difficulty of enforce-
ment when a State is in noncompliance with customary international law). 
 268. See, e.g., infra Part VI.A. 
 269. See, e.g., infra Part VI.B (discussing an ICJ decision that did not resolve Hungary 
and Slovakia’s dispute regarding a set of locks on the Danube River). 
 270. Barrett, supra note 258, at 133 n.6 (stating that “[c]ooperation may be sus-
tained . . . by using a strategy of reciprocity”). 
 271. See id. at 132-35. 
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that although a project would currently benefit the State, when other 
neighboring States take the same action, the State will be harmed.272
 Additionally, a harming State may be forced into compliance with 
the applicable laws or forced to abort or alter a harmful project not 
because of international environmental law itself, but because of in-
ternational pressure.273 International groups and leaders are likely to 
contact the State to show disfavor and lack of support. Additionally, 
a harming State is likely to receive hostile opinion and disruption 
from both its own citizens and the affected citizens of other States, 
and, possibly, even citizens internationally. 
 Damage to a State’s reputation from noncompliance is injurious; 
such noncompliance may deter other States from entering into future 
agreements with the deviant State. A State’s deviation from the law 
is problematic because “even a single deviation carries the risk of 
precipitating general erosion in law abidance, to the detriment of  
all states.”274
VI.   APPLICATION TO HYDROELECTRIC DAMS
 Even though many States attempt to maintain good relations and 
exert effort to manage transboundary watercourses, ultimately, in 
times of need, each State will presumably still act according to what 
is best for its own State. Thus, many times when one upstream State 
envisions an economic benefit from the construction of a hydroelec-
tric dam, that State may simply choose to take action regardless of 
the expense and harm the project will cause to other States which 
have rights to the same transboundary watercourse. Therefore, a sad 
reality is that many times States are harmed, and although there are 
relevant international environmental laws, the harmed State may 
still not be able to receive justice.  
 As noted, many multilateral and bilateral treaties contain specific 
enforcement mechanisms that the parties agree to follow in the event 
of later dispute, which do help avoid the problem of relying solely on 
the other State to abide by customary international law.275 As Prin-
ciple 24 of the Stockholm Declaration provides, many times such bi-
lateral agreements should be and are created specifically to deal with 
the watercourse issues that the neighboring States may be facing.276
Such bilateral agreements for actions like hydroelectric dam con-
                                                                                                                    
 272. See id.
 273. See, e.g., infra notes 338-44 and accompanying text (discussing a letter to the Bra-
zilian government signed by multiple organizations and individuals to show disapproval of 
the government’s actions).  
 274. Barrett, supra note 258, at 139. 
 275. For an example of a bilateral treaty containing specific enforcement mechanisms, 
see Part VI.A.  
 276. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 116, princ. 24. 
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struction and management will not necessarily prevent disputes from 
arising, but will ideally contain, with detail, enforcement mechan-
isms that the parties will use in case of dispute as well as contain an 
agreement to treat such decisions as binding. 
 Several relevant agreements (and lack of agreements) regarding 
hydroelectric dams and transboundary watercourses are identified in 
the following discussion. These situations exemplify the importance 
of bilateral agreements, yet show the enforcement deficiencies of re-
levant international environmental law—even when bilateral agree-
ments exist. 
A.   United States and Canada 
 The United States and Canada have recognized for many years 
the necessity for joint specifications and a specific joint body to ad-
dress transboundary water issues.277 The Boundary Waters Treaty 
was created in 1909 to “prevent disputes regarding the use of boun-
dary waters and to settle all questions which [were then] pending be-
tween the United States and . . . Canada.”278
 In Article II of the Boundary Waters Treaty, the United States 
and Canada agreed that while either State has “the exclusive juris-
diction and control over the use and diversion, whether temporary or 
permanent, of all waters on its own side of the line which in their 
natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary 
waters,” any such diversion “resulting in any injury on the other side 
of the boundary . . . shall give rise to the same rights and entitle the 
injured parties to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place 
in the Country where such diversion or interference occurs.”279 This 
recognition shows the States’ regard for Principle 21, the basic cus-
tomary international law principle of the right of a State to develop 
and exploit its own resources, but only to the extent that it does not 
harm other States.  
 The Boundary Waters Treaty additionally creates the require-
ment in Article IV that neither party will create “any remedial or 
protective works or any dams or other obstructions in waters flowing 
from boundary waters” where it results in raising the waters on one 
side of the boundary “unless the construction or maintenance thereof 
is approved by the . . . International Joint Commission.”280 This ar-
                                                                                                                    
 277. See generally Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to 
Boundary Waters Between the United States and Canada, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 
Stat. 2448 [hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty]. 
 278. Id. When the treaty was initially created in 1909, the parties were the United 
States and “His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and 
of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, [and the] Emperor of India.” Id.
 279. Id. art. II.  
 280. Id. art. IV. 
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ticle creates a legally binding formulation of the general principle of 
cooperation; without this “codification,” the duty to cooperate may 
otherwise be unenforceable.281 Additionally, harming States are obli-
gated to consult with those States which are negatively impacted; 
this concept was later codified in relevant sources of law.282
 The International Joint Commission (IJC) was created in Article 
VII of the treaty.283 Through its creation, both the United States and 
Canada recognized that each State’s action regarding the “lake and 
river systems along the border” affect the other.284 Through the IJC, 
“[t]he two countries cooperate to manage these waters wisely and to 
protect them for the benefit of today’s citizens and future genera-
tions.”285 While the Boundary Waters Treaty was created long before 
the creation of either the Helsinki Rules or the UN Convention, the 
treaty’s creation of the IJC shows a valuable concept, which was codi-
fied and emphasized in these later sources.286
 The Columbia River Treaty, also between the United States and 
Canada, specifically addresses the Columbia River basin rather than 
all transboundary waterways between the two States as did the 
Boundary Waters Treaty.287 The existence of the Columbia River 
Treaty itself helps prove the overall effectiveness of the Boundary 
Waters Treaty, and specifically the IJC:  
Canada and the United States, in the years since the [Boundary 
Waters Treaty], often with the assistance of the International 
Joint Commission created by the [Treaty], have concluded several 
river agreements, the most important of which is the 1964 Colum-
bia River Treaty. This accord resolved one of the most acrimonious 
boundary water conflicts between the two countries.288
                                                                                                                    
 281. See supra Part IV.A.2(c).
 282. See UN Convention, supra note 176, arts. 7-8; Berlin Rules, supra note 138, art. 
11; Helsinki Rules, supra note 177, art. XXIX. 
 283. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 277, art. VII. 
 284. International Joint Commission, Who We Are, http://www.ijc.org/en/background/ 
ijc_cmi_nature.htm (last visited June 1, 2009). 
 285. Id. Note, however, that while many of the same themes were agreed to through 
the creation of these treaties, neither the United States nor Canada ratified the UN Con-
vention. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 183.  
 286. The creation of the IJC shows yet another application of including general prin-
ciples in a bilateral treaty, which ultimately makes those otherwise unenforceable prin-
ciples legally binding, Specifically, the IJC clearly recognizes the overall themes of the Pre-
cautionary Principle and the Principle of Sustainable Development. This is clear based on 
the Treaty’s focus on the States working together to preserve the water for today’s use 
(presumably by doing careful analyses of impacts on the environment of each State) and by 
doing this in such a way so as to preserve for future generations. See generally Boundary 
Waters Treaty, supra note 277. 
 287. See generally Treaty Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Resources 
of the Columbia River Basin, U.S.-Can., Jan. 17, 1961, 15 U.S.T. 1555 [hereinafter Colum-
bia River Treaty]. 
 288. Patricia Wouters, Foreword to INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS 
OF PROFESSOR CHARLES B. BOURNE, at xv (Patricia Wouters ed., 1997) (citations omitted). 
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The Columbia River Treaty specifically sets out development re-
quirements for both the United States and Canada and arrange-
ments for implementation.289 Article XV establishes a Permanent 
Engineering Board that, among other things, ensures that the Trea-
ty’s objectives are being met.290 Article XVI then specifies that those 
differences arising under the Treaty that cannot be resolved may be 
referred to the IJC by either State.291 If the IJC does not make a de-
termination within three months, either party may then “submit the 
difference to arbitration by written notice to the other.”292 The Treaty 
then provides details about the arbitrational tribunal.293
 Although these treaties and the creation of the IJC have not com-
pletely prevented disagreement between the United States and Can-
ada,294 they provide procedures and mechanisms that, overall, have 
assisted the States in working through their differences and ulti-
mately reach agreements regarding shared water basins.295 Addition-
ally, the very existence of the IJC is an important attribute, as many 
States have no joint mechanism to deal with transboundary water-
course decisions and disputes.296
                                                                                                                    
 289. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 287, art. II (development by Canada); id. art. 
III (development by United States); id. art. XIV (arrangements for implementation). 
 290. Id. art. XV, § 2. The Permanent Engineering Board is also required to “assemble 
records” of the river flows of the boundary between the United States and Canada, report 
to the countries when there is “substantial deviation from the hydroelectric and flood con-
trol operating plans,” “assist in reconciling differences” between the countries regarding 
“technical or operational matters,” periodically inspect to “ensur[e] that the objectives of 
the Treaty are being met,” report to the United States and Canada “at least once a year of 
the results being achieved under the Treaty,” and “investigate and report” on other mat-
ters that arise “within the scope of the Treaty” when either country requests. Id.
 291. Id. art. XVI, § 1. 
 292. Id. art. XVI, § 2. 
 293. Id. art. XVI, § 3.
 294. Specifically, the existence of the Boundary Waters Treaty did not prevent dispute 
regarding the Columbia River; thus the Columbia River Treaty was created. See supra
note 287 and accompanying text. Likewise, the Columbia River Treaty did not completely 
deter dispute. For example, “when the term of the sale of downstream benefits under [the 
Columbia River Treaty] expired, a new agreement . . . was reached only after considerable 
controversy and disagreement.” Wouters, supra note 288, at xv (emphasis added). 
 295. INST. FOR U.S. POLICY RESEARCH, UNIV. OF CALGARY, CONFERENCE REPORT,
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER POLICY ISSUES: THE WESTERN NORTH AMERICAN REGION 1 (2007)
(noting that while transboundary water “is very much under dispute, . . . Canada and the 
United States have been relatively successful in negotiating transboundary water where 
others have been less successful”); Stephen J. Randall, Executive Summary, in 2 INST. FOR 
U.S. POLICY RESEARCH, TRANS-BOUNDARY WATER POLICY ISSUES: THE WESTERN NORTH 
AMERICAN REGION, OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES SPECIAL ED. 1, 1 (2008) (“[I]n spite of the 
cross border disputes that have arisen between Canada and the United States the two 
countries actually have an envious record in resolving disputes, as for instance in the case 
of the Columbia Basin Treaty and the longstanding work of the International Joint Com-
mission (IJC).”); see also text accompanying supra note 288. 
 296. See INST. FOR U.S. POLICY RESEARCH, supra note 295, at 1; Randall, supra note 
295, at 1 (emphasizing that much of the successful negotiating between the United States 
and Canada is a result of the IJC’s effectiveness, and that fifty-five of the fifty-six disputes 
submitted to the IJC were resolved unanimously). 
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B.   Hungary and Slovakia 
 An examination of the highly publicized dispute between Hungary 
and Slovakia demonstrates that even when a final decision of the ICJ 
is rendered, the dispute may still not be resolved.297 Hungary and 
Slovakia signed a bilateral treaty in September 16, 1977, which en-
tered into force on June 30, 1978, regarding construction and opera-
tion of the Gab?íkovo-Nagymaros System of Locks in the Danube 
River, which included a hydroelectric power plant.298 The 1977 Trea-
ty also set forth specific procedures for dispute resolution.299
 Hungary never began part of the construction that the agreement 
mandated.300 Hungary claimed that there was not “adequate know-
ledge of the consequences of environmental risks” and that more stu-
dies were necessary.301 In response, Slovakia diverted the Danube 
River and implemented a “provisional solution,” aiming to provide 
the benefits that it had anticipated receiving from the system  
of locks.302
 Hungary and Slovakia each claimed that the other violated the 
1977 Treaty, based on different theories of violation.303 All attempts 
to use the designated enforcement procedures set forth in the 1977 
Treaty failed, and eventually the case was submitted to the ICJ, 
which had been agreed upon in the 1977 Treaty as the court of last 
resort.304 The ICJ held that both parties had violated international 
law but, ultimately, without giving specific instructions on what each 
State was then to do, said that the Treaty as agreed upon was still in 
force.305 The ICJ provided that Hungary and Slovakia had a duty to 
negotiate and, while doing so, to take into account the principles of 
environmental law.306
 Ultimately, although the ICJ rendered a decision, the dispute was 
not completely resolved.307 There has been at least one appeal to the 
ICJ for an additional judgment,308 and there have been multiple ne-
gation attempts between Hungary and Slovakia.309 Specifically, after 
the ICJ’s decision, Hungary and Slovakia entered into negotiations, 
                                                                                                                    
 297. Case Concerning the Gab?íkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 
7, 42 (Sept. 25).  
 298. Id. at 14, 20. 
 299. Id. at 23. 
 300. Id. at 31-33. 
 301. Id.
 302. Wouters, supra note 288, at xviii. 
 303. Gab?íkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. 7 at 15-16, 35-38; Wouters, supra note 
288, at xviii. 
 304. Gab?íkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. 7 at 11. 
 305. Id. at 54-56; see also Llamzon, supra note 266, at 833. 
 306. Llamzon, supra note 266, at 833. 
 307. See id. at 833-34. 
 308. Id. at 833. 
 309. Id.
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which “broke down” in 1998.310 After negotiations failed, Slovakia re-
quested the ICJ give another judgment because of Hungary’s alleged 
unwillingness to negotiate in good faith.311 In 2002 and 2003, there 
was “some talk” that Slovakia would return to the ICJ.312 In 2004, 
following a two-year period of no negotiation, Hungary and Slovakia 
each announced that they were willing to continue negotiations for 
implementation of the original ICJ decision.313 These negotiations, 
however, apparently accomplished very little.314
C.   Brazil and Bolivia 
 Yet another unfortunate example of the difficulty of enforcement 
is the present dispute between Brazil and Bolivia. “The eternal ten-
sion between Brazil’s need for economic growth and the damage that 
[it] can cause to the environment are nowhere more visible than here 
in this corner of the western Amazon region.”315 This dispute not only 
demonstrates a State’s internal struggle between its need for effi-
cient energy and its efforts toward environmental preservation, but it 
also shows the direct application, or rather the lack thereof, of inter-
national environmental laws and their enforcement.  
 Brazil, one of the world’s leading dam-building nations,316 is cur-
rently demonstrating the extent of international dispute resulting 
from a State’s lack of regard for the environment, transboundary 
States, and the relevant law. In 2007, the Brazilian government ap-
proved other hydroelectric dam projects, including the Santo Antonio 
and Jirau dams, which will be constructed on the Madeira River.317
According to Glenn Switkes, Director of International Rivers Net-
work’s Latin America office, these projects “[will] dam the Amazon’s 
principal tributary, causing dramatic changes to the riverine ecology 
and affect[] thousands of families who depend on the river for in-
come, nutrition, and agriculture.”318
 Before the project’s approval, and even since its approval, the 
project has stirred ongoing controversy both within Brazil and inter-
nationally, based largely on the environmental impacts on neighbor-
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ing Bolivia.319 Proponents of the Santo Antonio and Jirau dams claim 
that without the dams, serious blackouts will result in Brazil, and 
they assert that construction of the dams will create many new 
jobs.320 However, “[a]s environmentalists see it, the dams, one of 
which is to be barely 20 miles from Brazil’s border with Bolivia, will 
not only add to the strains on the Amazon, but also generate tensions 
within the country and between Brazil and its neighbors.”321
 Independent studies prepared by the state public attorney’s office 
in Rôndonia, Brazil and by IBAMA, the Brazilian government’s envi-
ronmental agency (under the previous executive board), 
confirm what environmentalists and social movements have 
feared—that the Madeira project would cause enormous impacts. 
These would be felt over thousands of kilometers, from the mouth 
of the mighty Amazon and up the Madeira into neighboring Boli-
via and Peru. A principal factor is the Madeira’s extremely high 
sediment load—the river carries millions of tons of clay, sand, and 
silt from the Andean slopes where it is born to the Amazon River, 
where it accounts for half of all the sediments along the lower 
Amazon. Studies have shown that when the dams begin operation, 
the upstream Jirau reservoir would fill up with sediments, extend-
ing the flooded area into rainforests in neighboring Bolivia. The  
retention of these sediments behind the walls of the dams would 
also rob downstream floodplains of the precious nutrients that  
fertilize agricultural lands and help sustain the Madeira’s incredi-
ble biodiversity . . . .322
Additionally, critics claim that the dams will put thirty-three endan-
gered mammal species at risk of extinction, including the spotted ja-
guar, giant anteater, giant armadillo, and giant otter.323
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 On July 9, 2007, IBAMA granted the preliminary license for the 
construction of the project.324 IBAMA eventually released the final 
report in November 2007.325 It took IBAMA approximately two years 
to approve the project, and even with passage, IBAMA included thir-
ty-three conditions with which the winning consortium  
must comply.326
 On December 10, 2007, despite the ongoing controversy, the Bra-
zilian government auctioned off the construction contract for the 
Santo Antonio dam.327 A few days earlier, on December 6, 2007, 
Friends of the Earth-Brazilian Amazon filed an injunction to suspend 
the December 10th auction and argued that “the IBAMA technical 
team recommended through its impact assessment that neither Ma-
deira River dam should receive a preliminary environmental li-
cense.”328 On the morning of the auction, dissatisfied Brazilian 
groups delayed the start of the auction and disrupted the bidding 
process, claiming that the project would “displace thousands and 
harm the environment”; protesters were ultimately forced to stop by 
Brazilian police officers.329
 In August 2008, the Brazilian government officially granted the 
consortium a license for the Santo Antonio Dam project.330 Addition-
ally, Brazil sent eviction notices to 3,000 indigenous people living in 
the area of the dam construction, requiring that they “abandon their 
lands” by August 30, 2008.331 Construction on the Santo Antonio dam 
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began in September 2008,332 and the dam is expected to be function-
ing in 2012.333 Most recently, on December 23, 2008, IBAMA fined 
the consortium constructing the Santo Antonio dam the equivalent of 
over $3 million for killing eleven tons of fish, including catfish, dur-
ing the dam’s initial construction phases.334 Also in December 2008, 
the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) announced that 
it would fund sixty percent of the project, an amount less than it had 
initially promised.335 This decrease was “apparently because even 
BNDES is scared about the project’s risks and wants to share them 
with other investors.”336 The “mass killing” of fish337 along with the 
decrease in funding demonstrates that critics’ concerns about the 
dam project are likely very accurate.
 Glenn Switkes commented in 2007 that “[a]round the world, 
people are appalled by the cynical and dishonest manner in which 
the Brazilian government has side-stepped due process and pushed 
through the Madeira Dams, despite evidence that they will have 
massive impacts on the Amazon Basin ecology.”338
 Global dissatisfaction is apparent through a September 21, 2007, 
Coalition letter written to Brazilian Foreign Relations Minister Celso 
Amorim and Brazilian Presidential Chief-of-Staff Dilma Rousseff.339
Although it is not apparent (or at least not yet) in this particular con-
troversy, this letter shows how a State may be pressured into com-
plying with international environmental laws even where it is initial-
ly willing to violate.340 The Coalition letter contains an extensive list 
of individuals and organizations that support “the formation of bi-
national working groups [between Brazil and Bolivia] to assess the 
potential impacts on Bolivia of the Santo Antonio and Jirau dams on 
the Madeira River, the Amazon’s principal tributary.”341
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 The letter addresses the relevant harm by stating that “[o]fficial 
project studies and independent expert opinions indicate that there 
is a distinct probability that Bolivia could suffer flooding of territo-
ries . . . ; loss of fish species and serious impacts on some of the most 
important fish currently populating the upper Madeira; and  
health impacts.”342
 Further, the coalition addresses Brazil’s legal duty by stating that 
[t]he need for prior assessment of the possibility of negative im-
pacts of this significance using the “precautionary principle” is af-
firmed in international treaties, including the Montreal Protocol 
(1987) and the Rio de Janeiro Declaration on Environment and 
Development (1992). The Convention on Biological Diversity 
(1992), which both Bolivia and Brazil have subscribed to, holds 
that sovereign states have “the responsibility to ensure that activi-
ties within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of na-
tional jurisdiction.”343
The letter concludes by emphasizing that the Coalition “trust[s] that 
representatives of civil society organizations (CSOs) and independent 
technical experts will be guaranteed participation in [the] process, 
and that the working group meetings will be conducted in a transpa-
rent manner.”344
 Although Brazilian supporters have circumvented this necessity 
and moved forward with the preparation and actual construction of 
these dams, by law, Brazil is obligated to consider the potential im-
pact to the entire river basin.345 Thus, in its determination to con-
struct the Santo Antonio and Jirau dams, Brazil should have consi-
dered (and should continue to consider) the effects to Peru and Boli-
via, both of which are in the same river basin.346
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VII.   CONCLUSION
A.   Regarding Environmental Harm 
 While on the surface each State seems interested in preserving in-
ternational watercourses, it can be presumed that, naturally, each 
State’s ultimate concern is the effect on its own territory. Assuming 
this is true, each State is only secondarily concerned with the even-
tual effects of its actions on other States. 
 While there is much opposition regarding hydroelectric dams, 
most of these opponents “do not believe that [any] dam should ever 
be constructed.”347 Rather, they simply believe that development 
projects, including dams, “should only be built after all relevant 
project information has been made public; the claims of project pro-
moters of the economic, environmental, and social benefits and costs 
of projects are verified by independent experts; and when affected 
people agree that the project should be built.”348
 This position is justified. Hydroelectric dam construction should 
not be eliminated, as there indeed are advantages to these dams, es-
pecially as a source of reliable energy production. But each State 
clearly has an obligation, and should fulfill that obligation, to tho-
roughly plan and analyze the likely effects of a proposed hydroelec-
tric dam before construction begins, even where a State considers the 
construction to be hugely profitable and a necessity for energy pur-
poses. This would ensure compliance with such concepts as equitable 
utilization, by ensuring that the construction is truly the optimal 
equitable and reasonable use of the watercourse itself, rather than 
simply an equitable and reasonable use for the particular State. A 
State’s concern regarding the condition of its environment would also 
be in line with general principles of international law, namely the 
Precautionary Principle and Principle of Sustainable Development.  
B.   Regarding Brazil and Bolivia Specifically 
 Because customary international law is binding on all States, with 
regard to Brazil and Bolivia, Stockholm Principle 21 is definitely 
binding,349 the duty to cooperate is definitely binding,350 and the Pre-
cautionary Principle is likely binding (depending upon which argu-
ment prevails regarding whether the principle truly is customary in-
ternational law).351 Further, while the Principle of Sustainable De-
velopment is not clearly customary international law, it still receives 
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widespread use throughout the international community,352 and thus 
it would not be unreasonable for one of those countries to presume 
that the other should adhere to the principle. Unfortunately, howev-
er, these principles lack any definite enforcement mechanisms and 
thus it is in essence impossible for Bolivia to force Brazil to comply 
based on these principles alone. 
 Additionally, even assuming that the Helsinki Rules are customa-
ry international law, there still are no definite enforcement mechan-
isms within, but rather there is a framework as to how bilateral 
agreements should be arranged. Likewise, even if the UN Convention 
were actually in force, neither Brazil nor Bolivia has ratified it. Fur-
ther, even if both parties had ratified it, because it is also a frame-
work convention, without a bilateral treaty specifying enforcement 
mechanisms, Bolivia may still have no route for enforcement. 
 One hope for Bolivia, however, flows from the fact that both Brazil 
and Bolivia are parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity.353
Because both are parties, it is binding on each country, and thus Bo-
livia may be entitled to proceed upon any specified enforcement pro-
cedures in the treaty. 
C.   Regarding Transboundary Water Law 
 An ideal situation would be one where a straightforward and well-
established set of laws and an intact precedent—similar to that of 
domestic law of the United States and many other countries—
currently existed on the international level. It would further be ideal 
if when ambiguities or enforcement problems arise, like those that 
exist as a result of the increased use of hydroelectric dams, a legisla-
tive body could mandate rules and compliance by a simple enactment 
of a relevant statute. While international environmental law sources 
relevant to hydroelectric dams, both general and international water 
law specific, do exist, an obvious deficiency is that these are not 
mandatory; realistically, no such international body has authority to 
force every State worldwide to comply. 
 Although there is no mandatory body, and thus no binding proce-
dure specifically addressing how and when a State may construct 
and maintain a hydroelectric dam on a transboundary watercourse, 
the sources we do have on the international level, namely the Hel-
sinki Rules and the UN Convention, are a definite start. The Helsin-
ki Rules, in existence since 1966, while never binding, eventually and 
for the most part, became customary international law.354
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 Over thirty years later, in 1997, the United Nations finally 
adopted the UN Convention to address and expand upon those 
themes that the ILA had addressed in the Helsinki Rules. As noted 
by the UN Convention itself, it is a framework, intended to be ex-
panded upon by States, with consideration to those States’ particular 
situations and the transboundary watercourses affected. Although 
the UN Convention has not come into force, and although it is not 
widely considered customary international law at least at this point, 
it is a step toward uniformity in State treatment of international 
fresh water issues, namely hydroelectric dams and the effect on other 
States. Additionally, the ILA’s adoption of the Berlin Rules in 2004 
further demonstrates that this is a body of international law that is 
likely evolving, thus (ideally) eventually resulting in a clearer accep-
tance of these recurring themes. 
 Important, however, is that while such transboundary water-
course specific sources of law are not clearly binding, there are some 
general principles of international environmental law that are bind-
ing, such as Stockholm Principle 21, the overall duty to cooperate, 
and likely the Precautionary Principle. And, there are other prin-
ciples not (at least yet) considered customary international law, such 
as the Principle of Sustainable Development, that are still important 
to international environmental law and adhered to by many States. 
Adherence to these recurring themes of international environmental 
law requires compliance efforts with an eye toward the effects on 
each State’s own environment and economy, as well as an eye toward 
the effects on other States. 
 Although such a scenario is ideal, realistically, it is not likely that 
worldwide each State will immediately begin to comply with all 
sources of international environmental law by taking into account 
both the effects to its own State and to others. This is the case not on-
ly because much of the law is not binding, but also because even 
where the law is binding, many States will, with little consequence, 
refuse to comply because, particularly with customary international 
law, there are no mandated enforcement procedures. 
 On a more plausible scale, however, is a goal for greater accep-
tance of the use of bilateral treaties between transboundary States 
for hydroelectric dam projects. Such use of bilateral treaties would be 
consistent with relevant sources of international water law and 
would allow consideration to the unique characteristics of the partic-
ular States and transboundary waters involved. Additionally, these 
bilateral treaties would allow the parties to include provisions impor-
tant to unique local and regional issues.  
 The creation of bilateral treaties is certainly not a final resolution 
to these transboundary watercourse disputes and enforcement me-
chanism deficiencies, as bilateral treaties certainly do not guarantee 
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that no future disputes will arise. However, even though not perfect, 
bilateral treaties do provide binding enforcement mechanisms for 
certain principles of customary international law, which otherwise a 
country would be unable to enforce.  
 Even more specific—and in a continued attempt to resolve dis-
putes between States who have negotiated a bilateral treaty—is the 
creation of some type of commission, such as the IJC created by the 
United States and Canada. These commissions provide a body com-
prised of individuals from each country that can decide difficult ques-
tions, such as those that may evolve through construction and use of 
hydroelectric dams on transboundary watercourses. 
 Overall, in addressing hydroelectric dams, there are, in the au-
thor’s opinion, two related, yet distinct, issues: (1) the actual envi-
ronmental harm caused by dam construction and use; and (2) the 
lack of adherence to relevant international environmental law. Of the 
two, it is more realistic and more effective to address the deficiencies 
of the law itself and aim for international efforts toward both overall 
compliance and additional development of the law. By focusing pri-
marily on the law, as opposed to the actual environmental harm, 
States will inevitably cause less harm to the environment of their 
own territory and the territory of other States. 
